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WEST VIRGINIA
LAW REVIEW
Volume LII June, 1950 Number 3
COMMON LAW PLEADING MODIFIED VERSUS
THE FEDERAL RULES*
MARLYN E. LUGAR**
Common law pleading, with statutory modifications, continues
to be the backbone of procedure in West Virginia despite the
adoption of so-called code pleading in the great majority of state
courts and in the federal courts.' Since the promulgation of the
new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which became effective in
1938,2 the adoption of similar rules for state courts has been recom-
mended by many writers. This reform has been urged not only for
states having common law pleading but also for states which have
long had code pleading,3 since the Federal Rules have eliminated
many of the restrictive features found both in common law pleading
and in the systems long found in code states.
It is not the purpose herein to propose the adoption in West
Virginia of all the details of pleading embodied in the Federal
Rules, although much might be gained thereby.4 If any revision in
* This article is the first of a series in which some of the West Virginia
rules of pleading will be criticized.
** Associate professor of law, West Virginia University.
1 In addition to the thirty-two states and territories which have adopted
code pleading, there are other jurisdictions which have been classified as quasi-
code jurisdictions because they show a close approximation to the code practice.
CLARK, CODE PLEADING 23 (2d ed. 1947).
" These rules are set forth in 28 U. S. C. A. following §723c (1941).
3 Illustrative examples: Brandis, A Plea for Adoption by North Carolina
of the Federal joinder Rules, 25 N. C. L. REv. 245 (1947); Oavit, The New
Federal Rules and State Procedure, 25 A. B. A. J. 367 (1939); Mitchell, Uniform
State and Federal Practice: A New Demand for More Efficient Judicial Procedure,
24 A. B. A. J. 981 (1938); Phillips, Should the Rules of Federal Civil Procedure
Be Adopted in Florida, 26 A. B. A. J. 873 (1940); Comment, Pleading and Pre-
Trial Practice-Wisconsin Code Compared with the New Federal Rules of
Procedure, [1938] Wis. L. Rav. 517; Note, The Bar Favors Uniform State and
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 18 TEMP. L. Q. 145 (1943).
4 See articles cited in note 3 supra. If a state code of civil procedure
patterned on the new Federal Rules be adopted, revisions therein should be
considered when the federal rules are amended. See 33 J. Am. JuD. Soc'y 69
(1949).
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West Virginia pleading be made along the lines herein suggested,
a detailed examination of'all related federal rules should be made.3
However, to accept either objective and adequately develop the
subject herein would require a paper too lengthy for the average
practitioner to find the time to read and digest. Several times the
differences between the new procedure in federal courts and the
West Virginia procedure have been called to the attention of the
bar in a general way.8 No action to obtain changes in our procedure
has followed. The writer believes that the advantages in the
federal procedure will be more evident if smaller segments of the
differences are examined more in detail. This will permit those
who advocate a change in the West Virginia rules to give specific
illustrations of what may be accomplished by adopting the federal
procedure. Recently the Judicial Council of West Virginia has
taken a step in this direction by a thorough study of the advisability
of abolishing Rule Days and vacations between terms of court in
West Virginia and accepting in lieu thereof the method used in
federal courts for maturing a case for hearing.7
There have been chosen for discussion in this paper certain
rules of pleading in West Virginia which have resulted in unneces-
7 Piecemeal reform may lead to greater confusion than the adoption of an
entire integrated procedural system which embodies the desired changes. See
Clark, Dissatisfaction with Piecemeal Reform, 24 J. AM. Jun. Soc'Y 121 (1940).
6 Nesbitt, The Proposed Rules for Changes in Federal Practice, 43 W. VA.
L. Q. 23 (1936), 110 (1937). This was an address delivered at an annual meeting
of the West Virginia Bar Association. No encouragement to change our
procedure is found in this address. Typical of the views expressed therein arc
these statements:
"... We of the Virginias and of Maryland are about all that are left in
defense of our common law Alcazar. Our turn to surrender has come. The
glories of our past are but tales to be told. A new banner waves over our
fortress. The revolution is here. On the first of September of next year, the
conquerors plan to take charge. Sic transit gloria mundi." Id. at 119.
Sunderland, The New Federal Rules, 45 W. VA. L. Q. 5 (1938). This was
another address delivered at an annual meeting of the West Virginia Bar
Association, and the speaker stressed the objectives of the Federal Rules in the
abstract without demonstrating that the West Virginia procedure failed to
accomplish the same objectives. A similar approach was used without obtaining
affirmative action when an attempt was made to convince the bar that the scope
of the notice of motion for judgment procedure should be extended. Arnold,
Simonton, and Havighurst, Report to the Committee on Judicial Administration
and Legal Reform of the West Virginia Bar Association Containing Suggestions
Concerning Pleading and Practice in West Virginia, 36 W. VA. L. Q. 1 (1929).
The comments which were made on the proposed expansion of the motion
procedure are subject to the same criticism. Clark, Methods of Legal Reform,
36 W. VA. L. Q. 106 (1929), 6th Rep. W. Va. Judicial Council 266 (1947);
Sunderland, Comments on Proposed Changes in Procedure in West Virginia,
36 W. VA. L. Q. 119 (1929), 6th Rep. W. Va. Judicial Council 285 (1947).
7 5th Rep. W. Va. Judicial Council app. III (1947); 6th Rep. W. Va.
Judicial Council app. E (1947).
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sary delay in the determination of rights between the parties to
litigation. The operation of the Federal Rules not only has
emphasized that the rules to be analyzed have retarded unnecessarily
hearings on the merits but has also shown that an alternative
procedure is available which has deprived neither party of a fair
hearing on the claims between them. Others may believe that a
comparison between the two systems shows more glaring faults in
the West Virginia procedure which delay a hearing of claims on
their merits, but the ones which have been chosen herein for
analysis have been limited to rules which govern how a right must
be alleged and what rights may be asserted in one proceeding.
The writer originally intended to limit this study exclusively
to rules which apply to the latter problem and seem to require
unnecessarily more than one action to adjust rights between parties.
To a large extent that remains the objective of this study, but in
doing the research the writer became impressed with the many
delays in hearings on the merits which had resulted in West Virginia
merely from rules requiring needless precision in the manner in
which the right was alleged in the pleading. The temptation to
embody herein some observations on this somewhat related matter
could not be resisted since no clearer illustration of formalism
appears when contrasted with the liberality of statement permitted
in federal courts.
Criticism of the rules chosen has been limited largely to their
application on the law side of the court in West Virginia, for it
is there that the common law procedure, even as modified in West
Virginia, is most blameworthy. In the merged system of law and
equity found in the Federal Rules, the rules of equity pleading and
procedure have been accepted as guides.,
As will appear more fully in the following discussion, some of
the rules criticized not only delay the hearing of a claim but in
practice may even defeat a meritorious claim. If the rules were
necessary for any useful purpose, their existence might be justified
even if they caused delays or defeated the assertion of rights. How-
ever, in operation the Federal Rules have shown either that these
rules were never necessary or that the purposes which they were
designed to serve can be better accomplished by other procedural
devices.
s In some respects the Federal Rules are more liberal than the rules which
prevailed on the equity side of the court.
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Any proposed change in procedure naturally meets inertia
resulting from the lack of a desire to learn new techniques.0 Other
more selfish reasons may prompt some to resist any change in
existing rules of procedure. There may be some who believe that
the present rules are so definite and so well understood by them
that they need not have any fear of being defeated or delayed in
the assertion of a meritorious claim, whereas this same definiteness
of rules and knowledge thereof may be used to defeat or delay
recovery by others less skilled in the art when a defense on the
merits is doubtful. Perhaps the following discussion may disclose
that the rules here to be considered are not so definite or well
understood as was thought. Even if it develops that the rule is
definite and known, it may be shown that it serves no purpose other
than to be useful to defeat or delay a hearing on the merits. When
a procedural rule becomes an end in itself rather than a means for
the proper presentation of a case, not only does public criticism
become deserved 10 but also development of the substantive law is
retarded for the decision of a case on a procedural point relieves
the court from deciding the points of substantive law governing
the merits of the case. For these latter reasons all lawyers, regard-
less of the degree of knowledge of existing rules possessed or the
need to learn a new technique of pleading, should be interested in
eliminating a procedural rule which is unnecessary for proper
determination of the merits of the claims asserted.
The bench and bar of West Virginia have shown that they are
willing to accept modifications in procedure where the existing
rules have become mere technicalities or are not disposing of litiga-
tion as expeditiously as possible under some other feasible pro-
cedure." The many statutory changes in procedure and the more
recent rules of procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court of
9 "Inertia is not peculiar to lawyers as a group. Most of those who comprise
any profession or trade tend to venerate all its tmditions, and are unable
detachedly to inspect its customary ways." FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL viii (1949).
10 The average practitioner is prone to rationalize the need for any existing
rules of procedure, but he convinces neither himself nor others when the rule
is a mere technicality. Until such rules have been eliminated, business views
litigation with distrust. This reason for modernizing legal procedure has been
urged by many writers. Failure of the bar to take such action has resulted in
advice to the public to avoid the courts. See, for example, HIISCHMAN, How
BUSINESS MEN AvOID LITIGATION (n.d.)
11 Many of these changes were made prior to the adoption of the code
revisions in 1931. For example, statutes had dispensed with the necessity of
many formW allegations in pleadings. See the discussion of these statutes in
Carlin, The Common Law Declaration in West Virginia, 35 W. VA. L. Q. 1 (1928).
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Appeals under its rule-making power 12 have made this evident. So
many changes of this nature have been made that many may feel
that the existing procedure is now extremely liberal. The extensive
changes made by the revisers of the West Virginia Code in 1931 did
much to cause this feeling.'2 A superficial examination of the
general rules of _procedure in this state does much to confirm the
belief.
Despite the elimination of many of the technical rules of the
common law, an examination of the application of existing rules
with a comparison of treatment of similar facts under the Federal
Rules may show that further revisions in procedure in West Virginia
are highly desirable for the reasons previously mentioned. Facilities
for research did not permit this examination at the lower-court
level, where one might expect even more interesting illustrations,
but one may obtain enlightening and, from the viewpoint of
precedents, more valuable information in examining the application
of these rules in the Supreme Court of Appeals.
With this explanation of what the writer hopes to accomplish
through this study and why he has limited his field of discussion,
there have been chosen for examination certain phases of West
Virginia procedure which dearly contain many unnecessarily
restrictive rules. Those choseif have the additional advantage of
requiring little discourse to develop the preference for the federal
rules covering the same situation, having first made the deficiencies
in the West Virginia rule apparent. No attempt will be made to
develop all of the possibilities under the Federal Rules as related to
the problem in each subject, for that would unduly prolong discus-
sion. Others have developed these matters in great detail and with
clarity.' 4 The approach herein will be to show generally the common
law background and more specifically how West Virginia rules in
22 W. VA. CODE c. 51, art. 1, §4 (Michie, 1949).
13 The effect of many of these changes has been summarized by members
of the West Virginia bar. Carlin, Functions of a Demurrer under the Revised
Code, 41 W. VA. L. Q. 313 (1935); Carlin, Parties to Actions and Suits under
the Revised Code, 43 W. VA. L. Q. 87 (1937); Lynch, Pleading and Practice
under the Revised Code, 37 W. VA. L. Q. 60 (1930).
14 The most comprehensive treatment of any point which may arise under
the new Federal Rules will generally be found in Mooa's FEDRAL PRACTICE.
See also CLARK, CODE PLEADiNG; EDmUNDS, FEDERAL RuLts OF CIVIL PROCEDUR;
MANUAL OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE. For background material some of the erlier
treatises on code pleading are helpful, for example, Hmau.N, HnroRucAL
DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING (1897); PHruLLps, THE PRINCILES OF CODE
PLEADING (2d ed. Viesselman, 1932); and PoMRaoY, CODE REr als (5th ed.
Carrington, 1929).
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application remain unduly restrictive, making reference to the
I ederal .Rules applicable only to show that a less complex and more
liberal procedure has been found to be successful in practice. In
some cases it has been possible to indicate wherein the West
Virginia practitioner would already have had experience with a
similar procedure. Some reference will be made also to the earlier
rules of code pleading to indicate that in application they were
often subject to the same criticism made herein of the present West
Virginia rules.
I. JOINDER OF PARTIES AND CAUSES OF AcTIoN
One of the problems facing the pleader who desires to expedite
settlement of claims is the maximum breadth of his action. This
may involve the extent to which parties and causes of action may
be joined. I" Although each may serve as a limitation on the other,
they can be separately analyzed. Joinder of parties, plaintiffs or
defendants, will be used to refer to those cases in which two or
more persons have an interest in a claim (plaintiffs) or owe a duty
(defendants). Joinder of causes of action will refer to those cases
in which one person asserts several claims against another person.
The latter problem may be combined with the former where two
or more persons assert a claim or have a claim asserted against
them. Thus, the rules on joinder both of parties and causes of
action need to be considered.' 6
A. Joinder of Parties at Common Law
Joinder of plaintiffs at common law was required where their
rights were joint,1 but they could rarely join where their interests
15 The writer does not intend to cover all phases of the problem as to what
may or must be decided in one action. Professor Blume has reviewed the
developments in this problem at common law, in equity, under the codes, and
under the Federal Rules. Blume, The Scope of a Civil Action, 42 MICH. L. REv.
257 (1943).
is The restriction on joinder of causes applies when several plaintiffs or
defendants or both are involved as well as when only a single plaintiff and a
single defendant are involved. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 438.
17 Nonjoinder of plaintiffs. This was clearly true as to actions ex contractu,
and was equally true as to actions ex delicto where the injury was to property
or property rights and the interest therein was joint. 1 CHITv, PLEADING *8 (ex
contractu), *64 (ex delicto) (13th Am. ed. 1859); STFPHEN, PLEADING §§33, 37
(Andrews' ed. 1901); 2 TucKER, COMMENTARIFS ON THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 210 (ex
contractu), 221 (ex delicto) (1837). There seem to be no West Virginia cases on
nonjoinder of plaintiffs in actions ex delicto, but the common law rule was
recognized in contract actions. Sandusky v. Oil Co., 63 W. Va. 260, 59 S. E. 1082
(1907); Assurance Co. v. Fristoe, 53 W. Va. 361, 44 S. E. 253 (1903).
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were not joint.' s Thus, if the court determined the liability of the
defendant to be joint and all of the interested persons had not
joined as plaintiffs, the defendant by proper timely action could
defeat the action.19 The result was usually the same if the court
construed the duty of the defendant to be several and more than
one of the interested parties had joined as plaintiffs. On timely
objection, the misjoinder was fatal to the plaintiffs' case. 20  This
was true irrespective of the number of common questions of law
or fact involved in the litigation. A single act of the defendant
may have caused injury to many persons, but they could not join
as plaintiffs unless they had a joint interest in property injured.
A separate action as to the claim of each plaintiff was necessary.
2
1
These rules as to joinder of plaintiffs applied both in tort and
3s Misjoinder of plaintiffs. The rule that they could not join applied with
equal strictness to actions ex contractu and ex delicto. Pollock v. House &-
Hermann, 84 W. Va. 421, 100 S. E. 275 (1919) (ex contractu); Yeager v. Fairmont,
43 W. Va. 259, 27 S. E. 234 (1897) (ex delicto); I CHITTY, PLEADING *10 (ex
contractu), *64 (ex delicto); 2 TUCKER, op. cit. supra note 17, at 210 (ex contractu),
222 (ex delicto). The exception to the rule was that they might join or sever
in a tort action "if the wrong complained of caused an entire joint damage."
1 CHITTY supra *64.
9 Nonjoinder of plaintiffs in actions ex contractu, where the deficiency
appeared on the face of the pleadings, was fatal on demurrer, on motion in
arrest of judgment, or on writ of error. Where the deficiency did not appear
on the face of the pleadings, the defendant might take advantage of the defect
either by a plea in abatement or as a ground for nonsuit under the plea of
the general issue. 1 CHrrTY, PLEADING "12; STEPHEN, PLEADING §33; 2 TUcKER,
op. cit. supra note 17, at 210. Accord: Sandusky v. Oil Co., 63 W. Va. 260, 59
S. E. 1082 (1907); Assurance Co. v. Fristoe, 53 W. Va. 361, 44 S. E. 253 (1903).
Nonjoinder of plaintiffs in actions ex delicto could only be raised by the
defendant by plea in abatement or by way of apportionment of the damages on
the trial. I CHITrY, PLEADING *66; STEPHEN, PLEADING §37; 2 TUCKER, op cit.
supra note 17, at 222.
20 Misjoinder of parties plaintiff in actions ex contractu or ex delicto could
be raised by the defendant in the same way in either case. If the defect appeared
on the face of the pleadings, the objection might be made by demurrer, motion
in arrest of judgment, or writ of error; if the defect did not appear on the
face of the pleadings, the objection might be made by plea in abatement or as
ground of nonsuit under the plea of the general issue. 1 CUiTrY, PLEADING *64,
*66; STEPHEN, PLEADING §§34, 38; 2 TUCKER, op. cit supra note 17, at 221, 222.
These same rules applied to the manner in which an objection to the nonjoinder
of plaintiffs in an action ex contractu might be raised. See note 19 supra.
21 This type of deficiency on the law side of the court has caused the great
majority of courts to recognize that equity courts may exercise jurisdiction,
either on behalf of a numerous body of separate claimants against a single party,
or on behalf of a single party against a numerous body, where there is merely a
community of interest among them in the questions of law and fact involved
in the general controversy, or in the kind and form of relief demanded and
obtained by or against each individual member of the numerous body. 1
rONIEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §269 (Symons' ed. 1941). However, even the
courts which have adopted this view differ as to the extent to which it should
be applied. MCCLINTOCK, EQUITY §§177, 178 (2d ed. 1948).
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contract actions, although the defendant might be required to take
advantage of the defect in different ways. 2
Joinder of defendants at common law was governed by similarly
restrictive rules. Joint obligors or promisors had to be joined as
defendants,23 although some exceptions were made to alleviate the
harshness of the rule. 4 The rule was relaxed also as to joint
tortfeasors unless they as joint tenants or tenant in common failed
to perform a duty. In the latter case they had to be joined since
common title had to be proved.?5 In other cases the plaintiff could
sue joint tortfeasors jointly or severally or' any intermediate
number.z  This relaxation of the rule made possible therefore a
type of permissive nonjoinder. The question yet remained whether
the tortfeasors were joint or several.21 If the court treated the acts
of the wrongdoers as separate, no joinder was permitted;2 although
the consequence of misjoinder was not so severe as it was for rhis-
joinder of contract defendants. Here those defendants who were
improperly joined were merely dismissed.-" Joinder of defendants
2'2 See notes 19 and 20 supra.
23 1 CHrrrY, PLEADING *42; STEPHEN, PLEADING §35; 2 TUCKER, op. cit. supra
note 17, at 215. The West Virginia court recognized this rule. See State ex rel.
Kloak Bros. & Co. v. Corvin, 51 W. Va. 19, 27, 41 S. E. 211, 215 (1902); Hoffman
v. Bircher, 22 W. Va. 537, 542 (1883). As to the method of taking advantage
of the defect, see text at page 147 infra.
24 When the defendant pleaded or gave in evidence matter which barred
the action against him only, that is, a personal defense, judgment could be
given for such defendant and against the rest. The examples most frequently
given were bankruptcy and infancy. See Hoffman v. Bircher, 22 W. Va. 537,
542 (1883); Snyder v. Snyder, 9 W. Va. 415, 419 (1876). Other examples are
given in 1 CHIT-rY, PLEADING *42, *43, and in CLARK, CODE PLEADING §59. For
the West Virginia statute which has expanded the exception see text at page 151
infra.
2r- I CHITrY, PLEADING *87; CLARK, CODE PLEADING 374; 2 TUCKER, op. cit.
supra note 17, at 227.
21 1 CHIrrY, PLEADING *86; CLARK, CODE PLEADING 374; 2 TUCKER, op. cit.
supra note 17, at 227. This rule has been often recognized in West Virginia.
See Hains v. Parkersburg, M. & I. Ry., 75 W. Va. 613, 622, 84 S. E. 923, 927 (1915),
and the cases cited therein.
27 As to negligent injuries there is no comprehensive general rule which
can be formulated to harmonize all the authorities concerning what constitutesjoint liability. BusS, PLEADING & PRACTICE §59 (3d ed. Williams and Burk,
1924); CLARK, CODE PLEADING 377; Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability,
25 CALIF. L. REv. 413 (1937). Typical of the problems here involved is that in
Johnson v. Chapman, 43 W. Va. 639, 28 S. E. 744 (1897), wherein it was held
that the owner of an injured building might maintain a joint action against
the owners of two contiguous buildings which had fallen and caused the damage.
28 1 CHITrY, PLEADING *86; CLARK, CODE PLEADING 378; 2 TUCKER, op cit.
supra note 17, at 226.
29 The defendants improperly joined might demur, and if a verdict were
taken against all, the judgment might be arrested or reversed on a writ of error;
but the objection could be removed by the plaintiff's taking a verdict against
only one defendant. 1 CHI -ry, PLEADING *86; 2 TUCKER, op. cit. supra
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was also permissible in actions on contracts if the court construed
the contract to be joint and several.30 Here the plaintiff could sue
the obligors alone or together, but if he sued more than one he was
required to join all of them. 31 If the court construed the promises
to be several, the obligors could not be joined.3 2
One could defend these common law rules only on the basis of
the common law concept of the nature of the substantive rights or
duties of persons having joint or several interests or being under
joint or several liabilities, taking into consideration the common
law theory of a cause of action as an entity with the judgment being
in solido. The courts generally made no attempt to justify the
rules but were more inclined to bemoan the fact that they were
bound by ancient precedents. The procedural law remained static.
The courts seem never to have visualized the rules of joinder as a
means to shorten litigation.
B. Joinder of Parties in West Virginia Prior to 19313"
With this abbreviated statement of the common law, a brief
comparison with the West Virginia law prior to its "modernization"
may be an aid in revealing the extent to which recent changes have
removed or left intact the common law impediments to speedy
settlement of claims. Prior to the adoption of the revised code in
1931, the strict rules at common law as to nonjoinder and mis-
joinder of contract plaintiffs prevailed in West Virginia.34  There
was a code provision which might have been used to cure such
note 17, at 227; cf. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 378. In West Virginia the
objection was raised by a demurrer if the misjoinder appeared on the face
of the declaration, but the objection could be eliminated by the plaintiff's either
dismissing the misjoined defendants or amending his declaration to show the
community of action on the part of the defendants. Barger v. Hood, 87 W. Va.
78, 104 S. E. 280 (1920); Farley v. Crystal Coal & Coke Co., 85 W. Va. 595, 102
S. E. 265 (1920). If the misjoinder appeared only in the evidence, the plaintiff
might dismiss the action as to those not proved liable. Pence v. Bryant, 73
W. Va. 126, 80 S. E. 137 (1913).
30 1 CHrIrY, PLEADING *43; STEPHEN, PLEADING §35; 2 TUCKER, op. cit. supra
note 17, at 215. This rule was early recognized in the Virginias, with the
exception that the judgment would be reversed if an intermediate number
were sued even though the objection was not raised by a plea in abatement.
Leftwich v. Berkeley, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 61 (1806).
31 See note 30 supra.
32 1 CHITrTY, PLEADING *44; STEPHEN, PLEADING §§35, 36; 2 TUCKER, Op. Cit.
supra note 17, at 215.
33 The best treatment of this subject may be found in Jones and Carlin,
Nonjoinder and Misjoinder of Parties in Common-Law Actions, 28 W. VA. L. Q.
197 and 266 (1922). No comprehensive discussion of the subject will be
attempted in this paper, since it is important only for background purposes.
34 See notes 17 and 18 supra; Jones and Carlin, supra note 33, at 197 and 201.
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nonjoinder, but it was apparently never urged upon or applied
by the court for this purpose. The statute provided that whenever
in any case a complete determination of the controversy could not
be had without the presence of other parties, the court might cause
them to be made parties to the action or suit by amendment.,"
This statute was first enacted in 1882.-0 In Sandusky v. West Fork
Oil &c Natural Gas Co.,3" decided in 1907, one of the joint promisees
sued alone and recovered a judgment. The Supreme Court of
Appeals reversed the judgment of the lower court because of the
fatal variance between the declaration and the proof. Further,
the court dismissed the action without giving the plaintiff an
opportunity to amend. The court held that there could not be
an amendment of parties plaintiff in an action at law on a joint
contract. This was an application of the rule so often applied
by the West Virginia court that an amendment cannot be made
,which changes the cause of action.a8 The court was not asked to
apply the statute concerning nonjoinder of parties, but if this had
been done one might have expected the same treatment as was given
this statute in an earlier case involving nonjoinder of contract
defendants. In Rutter & Co. v. Sullivan, 9 a defendant, having
failed to plead the nonjoinder of defendants in abatement, at-
tempted at the trial to have the other parties made defendants by
amendment under this statute. The court refused to allow the
amendment, stating that to apply the statute to the case and make
new parties to the action would entirely destroy "a long established
rule in pleading." 4° May this not have been the purpose of the
statute?
W. VA. CODE C. 125, §58 (Barnes, 1923). It was apparently thought that
this statute applied only to suits in equity. For illustrative examples, see
Werninger v. Huntington, 78 W. Va. 107, 88 S. E. 655 (1916); Wheeling Creek
Gas, C. & C. Co. v. Elder, 54 W. Va. 335, 46 S. E. 357 (1903). See also note 40
infra.
36 W. Va. Acts 1882, c. 71.
37 63 W. Va. 260, 59 S. E. 1082 (1907); accord, Hatfield v. Cabell County
Court, 75 W. Va. 595, 84 S. E. 335 (1915); Phoenix Assurance Co. v. Fristoe,
53 W. Va. 361, 44 S. E. 253 (1903)..
38 A forthcoming issue of this Review will discuss this limitation on
amendments. Commentators approved the application of the rule in this case
under strict common law principles, and recognized thht the only remedy for
the plaintiff was to sue out a new writ. Jones and Carlin, supra note 33, at
199. Compare, however, the refusal of the court to decide whether an amendment
to cure a misjoinder of parties plaintiff in a contract action would result in a
change in the cause of action. Pollack v. House & Hermann, 84 W. Va. 421,
100 S. E. 275 (1919).
39 25 W. Va. 427 (1885).
40 Id. at 430. Having held that the statute did not permit the Uddition of
new parties defendant by amendment, the court declined to construe the statute.
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As indicated by the Sullivan case, the common law rule as to
nonjoinder of contract defendants prevailed in West Virginia, with
two statutory modifications if the issue were raised by a plea in
abatement. The law was not clear whether the issue had to be
raised by a plea in abatement if the defect was apparent on the face
of the declaration. If it was not apparent on the face of the
declaration, the law was settled that the defendant could take
advantage of the defect only by a plea in abatement. 41 But if the
defect was apparent on the face of the declaration, there were dicta
to the effect that a plea in abatement was necessary,42 but the early
Virginia cases, a number of which were binding authority in West
Virginia, held that nonjoinder of contract defendants apparent on
the face of the declaration could be raised by demurrer, motion in
arrest of judgment, or writ of error.43 Two statutes made it im-
portant to decide how the objection might be raised. One statute
provided that where pleas in abatement for nonjoinder of any
person as a co-defendant were used, the issue on the plea should
be found against the defendant so pleading if the other persons
could not be sued because of the statute of frauds or the statute of
limitations.44 Another statute prohibited the use of a plea in abate-
ment unless the nonjoined defendants were residents of the state.45
Without proceeding to trial upon an issue on the plea in abatement,
the plaintiff could amend his declaration and make the persons
named in the plea, as joint contractors, defendants in the case along
with the original defendant, appropriate provisions being made for
costs depending upon who was shown liable by subsequent plead-
ings or proof.46
Concerning the misjoinder of defendants in actions ex con-
tractu, the common law rule was that the defendant might take
advantage of the defect by demurrer, motion in arrest of judgment,
41 McDonald v. Cole, 46 V. Va. 186, 32 S. E. 1033 (1899); Rutter & Co. v.
Sullivan, 25 W. Va. 427 (1885); see Scott v. Newell, 69 W. Va. 118, 122, 70 S. E.
1092, 1094 (1911).
42 See Rutter & Co. v. Sullivan, 25 W. Va. 427, 430 (1885); Reynolds v.
Hurst, 18 W. Va. 648, 654-655 (1881).
43 Walmsley v. Lindenberger, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 478 (1824); Leftwich v.
Berkeley, 11 Va. (I Hen. & M.) 61 (1806). These and other early Virginia cases
are collected and discussed in Carlin and Jones, supra note 33, at 204.
44 W. VA. CODE C. 125, §18 (Barnes, 1923).
45 "No plea in abatement, for the non-joinder of any person as a co-
defendant, shall be allowed in any action, unless it be stated in the plea that
such person is a resident of the state, and unless the place of residence of
such person be stated with convenient certainty in an affidavit verifying the
plea." W. VA. CODE c. 125, §17 (Barnes, 1923).
46 W. VA. CODE c. 125, §19 (Barnes, 1923).
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or writ of error, if the misjoinder appeared on the face of the
declaration. 47 This rule prevailed in West Virginia.4 If the defect
did not appear on the face of the declaration, it was finally
recognized that the common law rule applied in West Virginia
and the defendant could not plead the misjoinder in abatement
but could only use it as evidence under the general issue.4 0 There
existed a statute under which the harshness of the rule applied at
common law might have been alleviated. It provided that in an
action founded on contract, against two or more defendants, the
plaintiff might have judgment against the defendants from whom
he might have recovered if he had sued them only, on the contract
alleged in the declaration, even though he might be barred as to
recovery from some of the persons he had sued in the action.50
However, the West Virginia court refused to apply this statute in
the way that the Virginia court had applied it, even though it was
adopted into the West Virginia law from the Virginia Code in effect
at the creation of the state."', The Virginia court held that the
statute permitted the plaintiff to recover against those defendants
who were proved liable under the contract even where the other
defendants were acquitted ori grounds which went to the denial of
the joint contract alleged in the declaration and was not limited
to those cases where some of the defendants were excused by virtue
of personal defenses.-' The common law had permitted the plaintiff
to recover against the other defendants in the latter cases. The
Virginia rule meant that the plaintiff could recover against those
who would have been liable if he had started a new action at
common law, but without the necessity of starting that action. The
pending action would suffice.
Despite earlier dicta to the effect that the statute had enlarged
the exceptions existing at common law (where some defendants
were able to establish personal defenses),- 3 the West Virginia court
47 1 CHrIrY PLEADING *44; see also other treatises cited in note 32 supra.
48 Stewart v. Tams, 108 W. Va. 539, 151 S. E. 849, 36 W. VA. L. Q. 373 (1930);
see Bolyard v. Bolyard, 79 W. Va. 554, 556, 91 S. E. 529 (1917).
49 Harris v. North, 78 W. Va. 76, 88 S. E. 603 (1916). But see Rutter & Co.
v. Sullivan, 25 W. Va. 427, 430 (1885); Urton v. Hunter, Harris & Co., 2 W. Va.
83, 86 (1867).
50 W. VA. CoDE c. 131, §19 (Barnes, 1923).
51 VA. CoDE c. 177, §19 (1860).
52 Bush v. Campbell, 67 Va. (26 Gratt.) 403 (1875).
5s Roanoke Grocery & Milling Co. v. Watkins, 41 W. Va. 787, 796, 24 S. E.
612, 615 (1896); Snyder v. Snyder, 9 W. Va. 415, 419 (1876). In the latter
case the court had referred to the statute as a qualification of the general rule,
one required "to promote justice, and avoid litigation".
12
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 3 [1950], Art. 2
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol52/iss3/2
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
in the first case in which lack of joint liability on the contract was
involved did nothing more than to affirm the common law excep-
tions.54 In the case some of the reasoning for denying the plaintiff
any recovery was based on the fact that the defendants had all
joined in the same plea. However, the basis of the decision was
broad enough to cover separate pleas. The court said:
"Does this statute change the rule of the common law in
case of a joint action against several defendants on an alleged
joint promise, when the plea is joint, and the proof shows that
all did not promise? Does not proof that one did not make the
promise discharge all? Would not that fact establish a different
cause of action, and constitute a fatal variance, not curable
by amendment?...
".... Plaintiff cannot allege a joint promise and recover
on proof of a promise as to some of the defendants only." 5
This decision was not overruled, although the court did reach an
inconsistent result on a later contract case by relying not on the
statute but on a case involving a misjoinder of tort defendants.8
There seem to have been no West Virginia cases on nonjoinder
of tort plaintiffs, but the above discussion indicates strict adherence
by the court to the common law rules which required all persons
having joint interests to sue jointly in tort actions." Advantage
of the defect could be taken only by a plea in abatement or by way
of apportionment of the damages on the trial, whether the defect
was on the face of the declaration or not.5 8 The statute above
discussed on nonjoinder of parties plaintiff might have been used
here,59 but from the treatment received in contract cases no help
could have been expected.
On misjoinder of tort plaintiffs, the defendant was permitted
to take advantage of the defect at common law in the same way
that he might if it were misjoinder of contract plaintiffs. 0 If the
defect was not apparent on the face of the declaration, the objection
could be raised by a plea in abatement or by a plea that traversed
54 Scott v. Newell, 69 W. Va. 118, 70 S. E. 1092 (1911).
55 Id. at 123, 70 S. E. at 1094. Any liberalization in the rules of pleading
concerning parties should be accompanied by explicit language to show that
the rules are to apply regardless of former concepts of causes of action or
misjoinder thereof. See the discussion of this problem in the text at page
201 infra.
GO Bolyard v. Bolyard, 79 W. Va. 554, 91 S. E. 529 (1917). For a more
detailed criticism of this case, see Jones and Carlin, supra note 33, at 274.
5 See note 17 supra.
58 1 CHrrTY, PLEADING *66; 2 Tucmt, op. cit. supra note 17, at 222.
59 See note 35 supra.
Go See note 20 supra.
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the declaration. If the defect was apparent on the face of the
declaration, the objection could be raised by a demurrer, a motion
in arrest of judgment, or a writ of error. These principles were
recognized in West Virginia."'
As noted before, no objection could be raised at common law
for nonjoinder of tort defendants, since one, or all, or any inter-
mediate number of joint tortfeasors might be sued.0 2  This rule
was recognized in West Virginia.63 Likewise, there was no way for
persons properly sued to object to misjoinder of tort defendants.0 4
Those improperly joined could demur if the declaration showed
the tort not to be joint. This type of misjoinder would usually
involve misjoinder of causes of action; and where this is true,
either defendant may demur.6  If the nonliability of the defendant
was not apparent on the face of the declaration, he could file a plea
traversing the declaration, and the plaintiff could on proof of his
nonliability have a judgment as to the others."0
In addition to the above general rules covering joinder and
nonjoinder of parties in actions at law prior to the adoption of the
Revised Code, two statutes had significance in limited fields. One
statute was applicable to certain negotiable instruments and pro-
vided that as to them judgment might be given jointly against all
liable by virtue thereof, whether drawers, endorsers, or acceptors,
or against any one or any intermediate number of them.' The
other statute applied to proceedings for judgment on notice of
motion (a summary procedure on contracts which provide for the
payment of money). Under this statute, the plaintiff was permitted,
as to any person liable for payment of the money, to move severally
against each or jointly against all, or jointly against any inter-
61 Yeager v. Fairmont, 43 W. Va. 259, 27 S. E. 234 (1897).
62 See note 26 supra. This was true whether the nonjoinder appeared on
the face of the declaration or not.
63 See note 26 supra. A statutory exception to the common law rule existed
where the plaintiff brought an action of ejectment. W. VA. CODE c. 90, §5
(Barnes, 1923), now c. 55, art. 4, §4 (Michie, 1949). Under a similar statutory
provision, the Virginia court held that nonjoinder of the occupant as a defendant
must be pleaded in abatement. Matoaka Coal Corp. v. Clinch Valley Mining
Corp., 121 Va. 522, 93 S. E. 799 (1917).
64 1 CHrrry, PLEADING *86; 2 TUCKER, op. cit. supra note 17, at 227.
65 Barger v. Hood, 87 W. Va. 78, 104 S. E. 280 (1920); Farley v. Crystal
Coal & Coke Co., 85 W. Va. 595, 102 S. E. 265 (1920); 1 CrrY, PLEADING *86; 2
TucKER, op. cit. supra note 17, at 227. Here, however, the plaintiff could cure
the misjoinder either by dismissing the action as to the misjoined defendants
or by amending his declaration to show a joint liability. See notes 193 and
221 infra.
66 Pence v. Bryant, 73 W. Va. 126, 80 S. E. 137 (1913).
67 W. VA. CODE c. 99, §11 (Barnes, 1923).
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mediate number.6 There were other statutory provisions appli-
cable to procedure where the plaintiff was unable to serve process
or notice on all the parties defendant, but for the purposes of this
paper notice of them is unnecessary. These two statutes are sum-
marized here because of their importance as the basis of the present
revised procedure.
C. Joinder of Parties Defendant in West Virginia
Since 193169
In the Revised Code of 1931 a single section incorporates the
substance of the former statutes dealing with joinder of parties
defendant, and it applies both to common law actions and to pro-
ceedings by notice for judgments on motions. The part of the
section pertinent to this paper reads:
"The holder of any note, check, draft, bill of exchange,
or other instrument of any character, whether negotiable or
not, or any person entitled to judgment for money on contract,
in any action at law or proceeding by notice for judgment on
motion thereon, may join all or any intermediate number of
the persons liable by virtue thereof, whether makers, drawers,
indorsers, acceptors, assignors, or absolute guarantors, or may
proceed against each separately, although the promise of the
makers, or the obligations of the persons otherwise liable, may
be joint or several, or joint and several .... 70
The breadth of the statute may not be certain, but it seems to
cover all the liberalized procedure permitted formerly and has
certainly extended the liberalization into fields formerly un-
touched.71  However, the modification as to joinder in this new
section applies only to contract defendants. The statute is limited
even in the contract field. The limitations will be discussed anon.
The procedure established by this statute seems objectionable
in that it encourages piecemeal litigation by permitting separate
actions against parties jointly liable without any excuse being
necessary for a nonjoinder.7 2  The common law as to joint tort-
68 W. VA. CODE C. 121, §7 (Barnes, 1923).
69 A more detailed discussion of the changes made by the Revised Code
of 1931 as to parties to actions and suits may be found in Carlin, Parties to
Actions and Suits under the Revised Code, 43 W. VA. L. Q. 87 (1937).
70 W. VA. CODE c. 55, art. 8, §7 (Michie, 1949).
71 For additional changes produced by this section which are not discussed
later in this paper, see Carlin, supra note 69, at 101.
72 Reference is not made here to permissive nonjoinder on the basis that
the nonjoined party has a personal defense. See note 44 supra. Excuses even
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feasors, which was not altered, is subject to the same objection.
What may be a more serious complaint is that the statute does not
make any change as to either tort or contract plaintiffs so that the
common law rules remain. This latter consideration becomes
especially important in considering what real change the statute may
have made as to permissive joinder of contract defendants, bearing
in mind that in this section the revisers did not attempt to modify
the court's concept of a cause of action and did not make any altera.
tion in the common law rules as to joinder of causes of action.7
Under the existing statute a plaintiff has the option on obliga-
tions falling within its provisions to change several contracts into
joint contracts, joint contracts into several contracts, or either class
into contracts intermediately joint and several. To the extent
that this permits joinder of claims and speeds determination of
liability, no objection is made. However, if this is done the statute
fails to give the trial court discretion to sever parts of the action for
trial even if necessary to avoid confusion. No consideration is
given to trial convenience.74 On the other hand, the plaintiff has
the option to change a joint contract, in which the questions of
law and fact are likely to be common, into several contracts or
contracts intermediately joint and several. Consideration is not
given to speedy determination of liability, since this is permitted
even where there is no excuse for a nonjoinder. To this extent
the common law seems preferable. The statute did make the law
consistent in actions at law and in proceedings for judgment on
notice of motion,75 but the field in which these practices were
permissible was more certain and more limited prior to the revision.
An examination of the scope of the present section will make this
evident.
In what proceedings does the plaintiff have the option there-
under to join or not join parties as defendants? The broader of
of this nature for nonjoinder were eliminated in the revised code, since such
defenses may be waived. See Revisers' note to W. VA. CoDay c. 56, art. 4 §34(Michie, 1949).
73 See the discussion of the problems which may arise where the rules as
to parties are liberalized but no changes are made in the rules concerning thejoinder of causes of action. Text at page 201 infra.
74 The brief criticism here made of the West Virginia statute will become
more apparent after an examination of the manner in which these problems are
treated under the Federal Rules. See the text at pages 200, 206 infra.
75 To this extent the change was commendable. The elimination of any
difference between the rights and liabilities of parties because of the form of
the remedy used by the litigant seems desirable. This was accomplished by the
revisers. Revisers' note to W. VA. CODE c. 55, art. 8, §7 (Michie, 1949); Carlin,
supra note 69, at 97.
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the former statutes had applied to any motion proceedings, but
our court has consistently held that such proceedings may be used
only on contracts which provide for the payment of money.76 By its
language the new section applies to the "holder of any note, check,
draft, bill of exchange, or other instrument of any character,
whether negotiable or not, or any person entitled to judgment for
money on contract, in any action at law or proceeding by notice for
judgment on motion thereon."7 7 Ambiguity is embodied in the
words "other instrument of any character" and "judgment for
money on contract".78 It is not clear whether the court will construe
the first phrase to apply only to instruments similar to those men-
tioned or will hold that they include all written contracts in the
possession of the plaintiff on which he may sue, whether for the
payment of money or for the performance of some other act. The
second phrase, applying to those cases in which the plaintiff is
entitled to recover judgment but is not the holder of any instru-
ment, is ambiguous in that "on contract" may modify "money" or
"judgment". Do the words mean "entitled to judgment on con-
tracts which provide for the payment of money", the limitation
heretofore placed on similar language in our statute dealing with
proceedings for judgment on notice of motion?70  Or do they mean
"entitled to judgment on contrat", thus including any contract
action, regardless of the nature of the contract? In any event, the
section applies whether the instrument is negotiable or not, 0 and
70 The statute provides that any person entitled to recover money by action
on any contract may, on motion, obtain judgment for such money. W. VA.
CODE c. 56, art 2, §6 (Michie, 1949). To use this proceeding the plaintiff must
show that money is due on a contract, it not being sufficient to show that he is
entitled to damages for a breach of a contract. Beckley v. Craighead, 125 W. Va.
484, 24 S. E.2d 908 (1943); Hensley v. Copley, 122 W. Va. 621, 11 S. E.2d 755
(1940); Houston v. Lawhead, 116 W. Va. 652, 182 S. E. 780 (1935) (for the
purchase price of a note under a warranty imposed by law); White v. Conley,
108 W. Va. 658, 152 S. E. 527 (1930). If the claim is for money due on a
contract, the proceeding may be used even though the contract is one implied
by law. Lambert v. Morton, 111 W. Va. 25, 160 S. E. 223 (1931); accord,
Grinrod Process Corp. v. Rothwell, 117 W. Va. 709, 189 S. E. 100 (1936) (upon
a judgment of a court of a sister state); Houston v. Lawhead, 116 W. Va. 652,
182 S. E. 780 (1935) (upon a Warranty implied by law). But cf. Moundsville v.
Brown, 125 W. Va. 779, 25 S. E.2d 900 (1943); Beckley v. Craighead, 125 W. Va.
484, 24 S. E.2d 908 (1943). Any doubt as to the availability of this proceeding
to collect forfeitures payable to the state under any provision of law was removed
by a recent statute. W. Va. Acts 1949, c. 94.
77 The remainder of this section which is pertinent to this paper is set
forth in the text at page 151 supra.
78 These two ambiguities were first noted by Professor Carlin in his article
on parties to actions under the revised code. See Carlin, supra note 69, at 102.
71 See note 76 supra.
80 This is expressly provided in the statute. See the quotation in the text
at page 151 supra.
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the former law requiring separate actions against a principal and
a guarantor,"' and exhausting legal recourse against the principal
as a condition precedent to suing the guarantor, 2 has been changed.
Another ambiguity seems present in the section. Does the
right to join a party exist if the liability is imposed by a separate
instrument? For example, can a guarantor who is liable on a
separate instrument be joined with the person primarily liable?
He may be joined if it can be salid that he is liable "by virtue of"
the instrument or contract on which the other party is primarily
liable. There is no other means of holding that the statute permits
joining such parties.
That joinder of persons liable by virtue of the same transaction
or series of transactions is unlikely if the liability is imposed by a
separate instrument is apparent from an examination of two West
Virginia decisions. The earlier of these cases indicated that such
joinder might not only be possible but that it might even be
required. In I State ex rel. Connellsoille By-Product Coal Co. v.
Continental Coal Co.,83 the defendant coal company successfully
interposed a plea of res adjudicata on the following facts. The
defendant coal company had secured an injunction against the
(use) plaintiff and had executed an injunction bond for $12,500
(surety not named), and later had executed an additional injunc-
tion bond with the present joint defendant as surety. The condi-
tions of the two bonds were identical, each binding the several
obligors, in case the injunction should be dissolved, to pay all
costs incurred and damages sustained by the plaintiff which the
defendant coal company should fail to pay. At the trial of the
plea it appeared that the plaintiff had earlier sued the coal company
defendant and apparently joined the sureties on the first injunction
bond, and further, that each item of damages alleged in the instant
case had been put in issue in the earlier case. Three of the five
judges held that the plaintiff's action was barred, stating, inter alia,
that separate actions by the plaintiff were not necessary even
though the bonds differed in penalties and sureties. Referring to
Chapter 55, Article 8, Section 7, of the Revised Code, the court
8iStewart v. Tams, 108 W. Va. 539, 151 S. E. 849 (1980) (maker and
assignor of a non-negotiable instrument joined as defendants).
82 Thomas v. Linn, 40 W. Va. 122, 20 S. E. 878 (1894) (assignee against the
maker of a bond or non-negotiable note). The court recognized that there
would be an exception if the debtor became insolvent before the bond became
due or from some cause a suit against him would have been unavailing.
Point 5 of the syllabus prepared by the court.
83 117 W. Va. 447, 186 S. E. 119 (1936).
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stated that "Since the two bonds herein may be regarded as one
instrument, the statute applies; and joinder of the several sureties
in one action on the entire demand was optional with the obligee."8 4
The two judges dissented, not on the basis of an improper interpre-
tation of the statute, but took the position that permission to join
the sureties did not settle the issue of res adjudicata.
The hope that this section might be thus liberally interpreted
was dimmed by the decision in State ex rel. Shenandoah Valley
National Bank v. Hiett. - Here the plaintiff proceeded in one
action against sureties on two supersedeas bonds filed in the same
chancery cause and with the same conditions in each. As in the
earlier case, the bonds had been executed at different times, were
in different penalties, and had been signed by different sureties.
The court held that the statute did not permit a joinder of these
sureties as parties defendant for recovery on the bonds. The court
expressly disapproved the earlier case as having been too liberal
and as not supported by the cases cited therein because based on
statutes too dissimilar from the West Virginia statute.86  This
general view of the statute was stated, "We think it plain that such
purpose to destroy the distinction between joint, joint and several,
and several liabilities is confined to the parties liable on any
instrument, . . . and is inapplicable to parties who are liable on
different instruments." 87 Judge Clark might classify this decision as
one based upon a "narrow, legalistic interpretation of the words
'the same obligation or instrument.' "88l
Are the rules which prevent joinder of parties in other cases
necessary to prevent the plaintiff from unduly complicating legal
proceedings? This danger may be suggested by those who would
oppose extension of permissive joinder. But, the common law
rules, and even the early rules of code pleading, which regulated
84 Id. at 453, 186 S. E. at 122.
85 123 IV. Va. 739, 17 S. E.2d 878 (1941); accord, Morris v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 130 IV. Va. 573, 44 S. E.2d 632 (1947).
81 The court indicates that a different conclusion might have been reached
if the statute had provided for joinder by the plaintiff of several causes of action
arising out of the same transaction. 123 W. Va. at 743, 17 S. E.2d at 880. Note
the similarity between this language and the proposal made herein. See
discussion in text at page 199 infra. The narrow problem here involved might
be met by umending the statute to read as the rule does in some jurisdictions
that indorsers, guarantors, and sureties, "whether on the same or by a separate
instrument", may be joined as defendants. See CLARK, CODE PLEADING §60 n. 171.
87 123 W. Va. at 742, 17 S. E.2d at 879.
88 CLARK, CODE PLEADING 388. Note that the statute permits joinder of
causes of action based on "separate contracts" if evidenced by the same instru-
ment. See Stewart v. Tams, 108 W. Va. 539, 542, 151 S. E. 849, 850 (1930).
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joinder of parties or causes of action were not designed to protect
the courts. In fact, they hindered the courts to the extent that
they gave the courts no power to control what causes of actions
might be joined within the arbitrary limits established by the rules
or what disposition the court might make of trial procedure after
the joinder had been made in accordance with the rules. The rules
were designed primarily to keep the issues simple before the jury;89
but aside from the fact that cases were often submitted to the court
in lieu of a jury, the rules permitted the submission of issues to the
jury that were more complex than they would have been in many
joinders which the plaintiff was not permitted to make. The
complexity of the issues which may be joined at common law and
under existing West Virginia rules will be developed presently.0
The real safeguard in these cases has been the desire of counsel to
present his claims in a way that the jury or court may easily find
their merits. He would not unduly complicate the trial in the
average case, even if he were given greater freedom to join parties
and causes. 91 If he does find it tempting to abuse rules of permissive
joinder because of the weakness of some claims and the strength of
others, or for any other reason, the court should have the power
to restrict the scope of the issues to be tried at one time if that is
necessary to protect the defendant from being prejudiced by a
confusion of issues.92 This discretion in the trial court would
protect not only defendants, but also the court, in cases where no
protection is now available under rules which arbitrarily determine
the scope of the trial by what is joined and joinable in the pleadings.
There has been only one additional relaxation in the rule as
to permissive joinder of parties defendant. In 1940 the Supreme
Court of Appeals promulgated a rule which permits a person having
80 In part the rules were designed to simplify and abbreviate the process
of pleading as much as possible in order to aid the judges at a time when the
pleadings were oral. It was for these reasons that one of the basic rules of
common law pleading was that the issue produced by the pleadings was required
to be single. However, even at common law it was recognized that this principle
applied only to a single issue in respect to each single claim, and several issues
were permitted when each related to a distinct subject of demand. The reason
assigned for the latter exception was that "otherwise there would be no
determination of the whole matters in demand." STEPHEN, PLEADING §134. The
strictness of the rule itself became avoidable at an early date when the plaintiff
was permitted to use several counts in respect to the same cause of action and
the defendant was allowed to use several pleas. Id. at 488-90.
90 See text at pages 168-180 infra.
91 This has been demonstrated in code states where the rules as to joinder
are more liberal than in West Virginia. See note, 36 W. VA. L. Q. 192 (1930).
92 The court .has this power under the Federal Rules. See text at page
206 infra.
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certain causes of action arising under insurance policies to join
the claims in one actionY3 A comparison of the problem in the
Hiett case with the facts covered by this rule makes evident the
correlation between party-joinder and cause-joinder problems.
Elaboration on this recent rule will be postponed since it serves
well to illustrate an approach to the technique used under the
Federal Rules to meet the criticism made and to be made in this
paper as to the West Virginia rules on joinder of parties and causes.
Additional consideration of the failure to permit freer joinder
of defendants as related to joinder of causes of action will soon
follow. The weakness of existing rules on joinder can be better
stressed by first examining the present rules on joinder of plaintiffs
and causes of action.
D. Joinder of Parties Plaintiff in West Virginia
Since 1931o1
As noted above, at common law no permissive joinder of
plaintiffs was permitted if their rights were several and no change
was made by the code revisers in 1931 as to parties plaintiff. No
lessening of litigation is permitted even though the additional
actions would involve common questions of law and fact. No
rule is better settled in West Virginia. In City of Wheeling v.
Trow bridge,9 one of the earliest cases to come before the Supreme
Court of Appeals, a husband and his wife brought an action for a
wrong to the wife, such joinder for a wife's recovery being necessary
at that time."6 The husband sought to recover in the same action
sums of money expended by him in her recovery. A demurrer to
the declaration was sustained because the husband should have
sued alone for the latter sums. It was held improper to join these
different "causes of action" because the damages could not be
severed.
In a series of cases the court has held that owners of separate
interests in the same land who have been injured by a single act
of one defendant cannot join to recover damages. 9T Here it is clear
93 Quoted in part in the text at page 206 infra.
94 A more detailed discussion of the changes made by the Revised Code of
1931 as to parties to actions and suits may be found in Carlin, Parties to Actions
and Suits under the Revised Code, 43 W. VA. L. Q. 87 (1937).
95 5 W. Va. 353 (1872). The court did hold that the declaration might
be amended. See note 193 infra.
90 A married woman may now sue or be sued alone the same as if she were
a single woman. W. VA. CoDE c. 48, art. 3, §19 (Michie, 1949).
97 Swick v. West Virginia Coal 8= Coke Co., 122 W. Va. 151, 7 S. E.2d 697,
47 W. VA. L. Q. 67 (1940); Logan Central Coal Co. v. County Court of Logan
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that most of the questions of law and fact will be the same. In fact,
the rule applied by the court in determining the measure of dam-
ages when they sue separately may require the jury to decide what
amount of damage was done to the other estate 8 What question
of law or fact remains that is not common to both actions? What
justification exists that another jury be required to hear all of the
same evidence and make the same computation, assuming that the
same evidence is available for the second trial? Conceding that
neither should be permitted to recover damages covering injury
to the entire estate,99 a simple instruction would solve the
problem.100
An interesting application of the rule appears in Yeager v.
Town of Fairmont,1°1 wherein two plaintiffs sued for damages
occasioned by a change of grade in the street adjoining the property
County, 106 W. Va. 578, 146 S. E. 371 (1929); Shaw v. Monongahela Ry., 100
W. Va. 368, 130 S. E. 461 (1925); Yeager v. Fairmont, 43 W. Va. 259, 27 S. E. 234
(1897); Jordan v. Benwood, 42 W. Va. 312, 26 S. E. 266, 36 L. R. A. 519 (1896).
98 ".. . the damage to the reversion or remainder is the amount that estate
is diminished in value.... But that is only the market value of the remainder
after the end of the particular estate, and it is difficult to get at that, unless
we ask the market value of the property before and after the injury, regardless
of the two estates, and then seek the value of the estate for years or life on the
basis of the annual rental value multiplied by the number of years remaining
of the term of years, or by the number based on the expectancy of life of the
life tenant." Jordan v. Benwood, supra note 97, at 321, 26 S. E. at 269.
99 Ibid. Note also point 5 of the syllabus prepared by the court.
100 If the owners of separate interests in the same land have been injured
by a single act of one defendant and they desire to combine their claims in
one action, the trial problems which would be presented are analogous to those
presented when a single plaintiff seeks to recover in one action from a single
defendant both temporary and permanent damages done to his land by the
defendant. In permitting the latter joinder the court stated: "Since the
defendant's rights may be fully protected in the deliberation and conclusion of
the jury by proper instructions, telling them what facts and circumstances call
for temporary or special, and what for permanent, damages, he is fully pro-
tected against injury from confusion of issues." Lyons v. Fairmont Real Estate
Co., 71 W. Va. 754, 758, 77 S. E. 525, 527 (1912). The joinder here suggested
would create even less danger of confusion from the defendant's point of view,
and the joinder would be permissive as to the plaintiffs. Even if it were com-
pulsory, it is submitted that proper instructions would protect the plaintiffs
against injury from confusion of issues as adequately as they did the defendant
in the Lyons case. See Note, 36 W. VA. L. Q. 199, at 202-202 (1930). Compare
also this reasoning by the court in a recent case in not permitting joinder of
defendants: "To hold otherwise an incongruous situation would occur in the
event a jury trial was had on the instant declaration. In the event the jury
should believe that both defendants were guilty of breach of the covenant, but
the breach of one of the principals was more grave than that of the other,
the jury would be unable to award just and proper damages as between the
two principals because an action in covenant does not permit the rendition of
two separate verdicts." Morris v. Maryland Casualty Co., supra note 85, at 576,
44 S. E.2d at 684.
101 43 W. Va. 259, 27 S. E. 234 (1897).
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of the plaintiffs. One of the plaintiffs owned a life estate in the
property, and the other owned the reversion or remainder, 10 2 but
both operated a joint mercantile business in the storehouse located
on the property. Damages for all three interests were sought. The
reasoning of the court is not impressive. In sustaining the conten-
tion that there had been a misjoinder of plaintiffs, the court said:
".... .If it was proper to combine all three of these causes
of action, it is difficult to determine in what manner the dam-
ages recovered should be apportioned among them. If the suit
was in equity, the value of the life estate might be ascertained,
and yet it would be difficult to say what portion of the damages
should be awarded the life tenant and what portion to the
remainder-man, and equally difficult to ascertain what portion
the plaintiffs were entitled to jointly by reason of the injury
to their mercantile business. . .. "103
One must inquire how this apportionment would become simpler
in a separate action for each "cause of action".10 4
An extreme application of the rule was made in Logan Central
Coal Co. v. County Court of Logan County.'0 - Here a tenant for
years was in possession of the land which the defendant illegally
took for road purposes, thus injuring both the leasehold and free-
hold interests. The reversioners assigned to the tenant their right
of action for a valuable consideration.,"" The tenant coal company
attempted to join the cause of action for injury to the leasehold
and the one for injury to the freehold, designating itself as a
plaintiff in its own right and designating the reversioners as plain-
tiffs suing for the use and benefit of the tenant. It was held that
the joinder was improper, since the lessor and the lessee could not
have joined. Other than citing precedents for its position, the
102 It is not clear from the facts in the case whether it was the reversion
or remainder; whether it was the one or the other is immaterial since the same
rules of joinder would be applicable. Cases cited note 97 supra.
1o3 Id. at 264, 27 S. E. at 236.
104 Compare the rule to be applied by the jury when the separate actions
are brought. See note 98 supra. Note also the criticism of this rule of joinder
in the preceding paragraph of the text.
105 106 W. Va. 578, 146 S. E. 371, 36 W. VA. L. Q. 199, 38 YALE L. J. 1153
(1929); accord, Keyser Canning Co. v. Klots Throwing Co., 98 W. Va. 487, 128
S. E. 280 (1925) when read with Siever v. Klots Throwing Co., 101 W. Va. 457,
132 S. E. 882 (1926).
106 Because of the broader scope of the amended statute permitting an
assignee to sue in his own name (note 113 infra), it should be noted that the
court has taken the position that a defendant cannot defend an action on the
ground that the assignment was without consideration, or question the motive
or purpose of the assignor in making the assignment. Id. at 464, 132 S. E. at
884, and the West Virginia cases therein cited.
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court on policy considerations has only this to say: "Such a joinder
might in many instances tend to confusion rather than to clarity
and exactness in issues. ' 1 7 The court itself apparently was not
pleased with the result, 08 and suggested that a different result
might be obtained by having such actions consolidated and tried
together. The only reasoning to support this preference, whatever
was meant by "consolidation" as used here, 109 was that it would
permit action which might be of value after verdict in determining
the correctness of the finding. If counsel for the defendant has
such fear from joinder, he may resort to the use of special inter-
rogatories. 110 The result in this case flowed from the common law
rule which failed to recognize an assignment of a chose in action,
except to permit the assignee to bring an action in the name of
the assignor for the use and benefit of the assignee.11" ' Our statute
at that time was not broad enough to permit the assignee in this
107 106 W. Va. 578, 580, 146 S. E. 371 (1929).
10 President Woods, writing the opinion for the court, stated, "The fact
that the owner of the leasehold is now the sole beneficiary of the entire recovery
is, to my mind, a very persuasive argument for upholding the assailed pleading."
Ibid.
109 This dictum apparently was not intended to suggest that consolidation,
as the term is normally used, could be employed to avoid the rules of joinder
as to parties. Blume, Joinder of Claims, 45 MICH. L. REV. 797, 803 (1947);
Note, 36 W. VA. L. Q. 199, 202-204 (1929). To be "consolidated" the claims
should have originally been joinable. See also note 154 infra.
110 W. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 6, §5 (Michie, 1949). It is realized that this statute
is not mandatory and that whether special interrogatories shall be submitted to
the jury is within the discretion of the trial court, subject to review. Richards
v. Riverside Iron Works, 56 W. Va. 510, 49 S. E. 437 (1904). In sustaining the
action of the lower court in refusing to submit to the jury special interrogatories,
the court in one case applied this test: "Here the issues were too few, simple
and clear-cut for the jury to have overlooked any of them in arriving at its ver-
dict. Special verdicts would not have assisted the jury in arriving at a correct
conclusion. Consequently interrogatories ...were not necessary in order to
impress on the jury a deliberation of the facts mentioned therein, and we see
no abuse in the discretion of the trial court in refusing them." Lovett v. Lisagor,
100 W. Va. 154, 157, 130 S. E. 125, 126 (1925). Even if the rules of joinder are
further liberalized, no different test need be applied in determining whether
special interrogatories should be submitted either to assist the jury or to test or
explain the general verdict. No different test has been applied in the field
where the rules have already been liberalized. In some cases it might be ad-
vantageous for the trial court to have the power to require the jury to return a
special verdict in the manner provided by the federal rules, but that question
is outside the scope of this paper. See Federal Rule 49. Such verdicts might
render unnecessary the separation of issues for trial in some of the cases discussed
later in this paper. See text at pages 205-206 infra.
131 Keyser Canning Co. v. Klots Throwing Co., 98 W. Va. 487, 128 S. E. 280
(1925) (claim arising out of tort); Barkers Creek Coal Co. v. Alpha-Pocahontas
Coal Co., 96 W. Va. 700, 123 S. E. 803 (1924) (claim arising out of tort); Gar-
land v. Richeson, 25 Va. (4 Rand.) 266 (1826) (claim arising out of contract;
applying a statute but recognizing the common law).
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case to bring the action in his own name on this assigned chose in
action."12
Under the statute, as revised, either the tenant or reversioner,
having an assignment of the chose in action of the other, ought to
be able to recover damages for the entire injury to the property.
The statute now reads:
"The assignee of any bond, note, account, or writing, not
negotiable, or other chose in action arising out of contract or
injury to personal or real property, may maintain thereupon
any action in his own name, without the addition of 'assignee,'
which the original obligee, promisee, payee, contacting party,
or owner of such chose in action might have brought .... In
every such action the plaintiff may unite claims payable to him
individually with those payable to him as such assignee, pro-
vided it be otherwise proper to join them. But nothing in
this section shall be construed to make assignable any right
of action not otherwise assignable.""13
Presumably that part of the statute which attaches a condition to
joining assigned claims with others of the plaintiff1 4 refers to the
limitation on joinder of causes imposed by the common law rules
concerning joinder of certain forms of action.", This problem will
be discussed in detail later, 1 " but this would seem to present no
obstacle in the instant case. rhe only possible objection would be
thd joinder of trespass counts for injury to the possession and counts
in trespass on the case for injury to the reversion. A statutory
122 The statute permitted an assignee to sue in his own name if he were an
assignee of a "bond, note, account, or writing, not negotiable." W. VA. CODE C.
99, §14 (Bames, 1923). In an earlier case the court had held that the statute
applied to claims or demands arising out of contract, express or implied, or some
fiduciary relation, but excluded demands arising from tort, relying in part upon
the language of the statute that such assignee might maintain in his own name
any oction which the original "obligee or payee" might have brought. Barkers
Creek Coal Co. v. Alpha-Pocahontas Coal Co., 96 W. Va. 700, 123 S. E. 803
(1924).
113 W. VA. CODE c. 55, art. 8, §9 (Michie, 1949). Italics supplied. See the
revisers' note to this section which states that the object of the changes was to
make the statute apply to all assignable choses in action and indicates that the
changes °were designed specifically to overcome the holding in Barkers Creek
Coal Co. v. AIpha-Pocahontas Coal Co., supra note 112.
114 ". . provided it be otherwise proper to join them .. ." (the statutory
condition for joinder).
131 The amendments in this section were made by the Revisers in 1931, and
prior to tht time Professor Carlin had suggested amendments similar to those
which were made. Note, 36 W. Va. L. Q. 199, 204 (1930). He suggested that
the condition be attached to prevent joinder of causes of action deemed incon-
gruous, specifically mentioning causes sounding in tort with those sounding in
contract. Id. at 205.
116 See text at pages 168-180 infra.
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change has made that joinder possible.11 7 Certainly there is nothing
about the subject matter which would prevent joinder of per-
manent and temporary damages from a single act by one
defendant. l s
Even though this statute offers possibilities of joining other
types of claims, it involves the necessity of assigning the claim to
another and the further question of whether the claim is one which
is properly assignable.1 9 Even though the defendant can not
question the purpose of the assignment, 20 the statute is in no sense
a real remedy for the problem of permitting plaintiffs with separate
claims involving common questions of fact or law to join in an
action to enforce those claims. The statute merely provides first
that action on the assigned claim may be maintained in the name
of the assignee, and then recognizes the common law rule that being
his claim he may join it with another cause of action that he might
have joined if both had originally been his.1"'
An approach somewhat peculiar was taken by the West
Virginia court in those cases which deal with recovery of the
statutory penalty imposed where coal mining operations are con-
ducted within five feet of the line dividing land from that of
another person without his consent 221 In Shinn v. O'Gara Coal
117 The action of trespass has been abolished; and in all cases in which it
would have been the proper form of action, an action of trespass on the case
will lie. W. VA. CODC c. 55, art. 7, §10 (Michie, 1949). This change permits
joinder of counts which would not have been proper at common law, that is,
counts in trespass with counts in trespass on the case. See text at page 170 infra.
118 The court has gone further and permitted the plaintiff to recover in one
action both permanent and temporary damages to his real estate even though
part of the damages resulted from separate and distinct acts of the defendant
where they were both done "upon the same premises and works injury of the
same kind." See Lyons v. Fairmont Real Estate Co., 71 W. Va. 754, 759, 77 S. E.
525, 527 (1912); accord, Clifford v. City of Martinsburg, 78 W. Va. 287, 88 S. E.
845 (1916).
119 Note that the statute expressly provides that it shtall not be construed to
make assignable any right of action not otherwise assignable. Quoted in text at
page 161 supra. See note 124 infra.
120 See note 106 supra.
1,-1 The narrow problem which was solved by the amendment is well sum-
marized by Professor Carlin. Note, 36 W. VA. L. Q. 199 (1930). The writer of
a case comment on Logan Central Coal Co. v. County Court of Logan County,
supra note 105, suggested that "the extreme conservatism of result" in that case
could be remedied only by the adoption of a modern code. 38 YALE L. J. 1153
(1929). The amendment followed the customary pattern in West Virginia of
solving one problem at a time rather than meeting the larger problem by the
adoption of provisions usually found in modern codes liberalizing the rules of
joinder of parties and claims generally.
122 "No owner or tenant of any land containing coal shall ... dig, excavate
or work in ...any coal mine within five feet of the line dividing such land
from that of another person or persons, without the consent in writing of every
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Mining Co.,1 23 the court held that there could be but one recovery
of the penalty, but that all beneficiaries under the statute might
join in an action to recover the penalty. A life tenant and a
remainderman were permitted to join in the action. 124 The court
refused to apply the common law rule since neither the right nor
the remedy depended upon common law. In this case the court
refused to say whether less than the whole number interested in
recovery could sue for the penalty, but in a case decided a few
months later the court held that the defendant could not defend
on the basis that some of the persons suing for the penalty were
not entitled thereto if other plaintiffs were entitled to recovery. 2 '
In this case the court said that it was immaterial to the defendant
whether it pays the penalty to one of plaintiffs or to all of them
jointly because one payment discharges the defendant as to all.
This reasoning would permit any person interested to sue alone,
and this is stated by the court in the syllabus to be true.12 No case
has been found in which the court decided whether or how the
penalty is to be apportioned among those interested in the re-
covery.12 7 In effect, the plaintiffs are treated as if they have a joint
interest in the property right violated, but at their election, or the
person interested in . . . such adjoining lands .... If any person shall violate
this section, he shall forfeit five hundred dollars to any person injured thereby
who may sue for the same." W. VA. CODE c. 37, art. 5, §1 (Michie, 1949).
123 72 W. Va. 326, 78 S. E. 104 (1913).
124 If the court had not reached this conclusion independently of any statu-
tory provision liberalizing the rules of joinder, the statute here discussed would
offer no assistance on the joinder problem since the right of action for this statu-
tory penalty is not assignable. Wilson v. Shrader, 73 W. Va. 105, 79 S. E. 1083
(1913).
225 Selvery v. Grafton Coal & Coke Co., 72 W. Va. 680, 79 S. E. 656 (1913).
126 Point I of the syllabus. The constitution provides that it shall be the
duty of the supreme court of appeals to prepare a syllabus of the points ad-
judicated in each case concurred in by three of the judges thereof, which shall
be prefixed to the published report of the case. W. VA. CONST. Art. VIII, §5.
127 The right to recover the penalty was not given for the purpose of in-
demnifying an injured person, nor is the amount of recovery measured by the
injury inflicted. The purpose of the recovery allowed is to punish for a viola-
tion of the statute, and an action for vindication of private right in property
is not precluded thereby. See Doss v. Toole, 80 WV. Va. 46, 49-50, 92 S. E.
139, 140 (1917); Gawthrop v. Fairmont Coal Co., 74 W. Va. 39, 41, 81 S. E. 560,
561 (1914); Wilson v. Shrader, 73 W. Va. 105, 109, 79 S. E. 1083, 1085 (1913).
This being true, it seems that no question of apportionment need arise even
though more than one person is interested in the adjoining land if only one of
those interested sues for recovery of the penalty. The court has taken the posi-
tion that there can be but one recovery of the penalty, and it might be held that
if only one of those interested sues he is entitled to retain the full amount for
his diligence. However, the writer is unable to see how the question of appor-
tionment can be avoided when more than one of those interested have joined to
recover the penalty and are unable to agree as to their respective shares therein.
228 See note 127 supra.
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election of any one or more of them, the joint interest may be
asserted by any number of those interested. To the extent that
joinder is permitted, or one or more is permitted to sue for all, it
avoids a multiplicity of actions which would be necessary if each
owner of a separate interest in the land affected were required to
sue separately, but if an apportionment is later to be made, addi-
tional litigation may become necessary under this procedure.12 8
Factually, the latter question however may never arise.
This approach was used in the one West Virginia case where
the court refused to approve the rule requiring separate actions at
common law by those with separate interests in the property in-
jured. In Curry v. Buckhannon & Northern R. R. Co..,'" four
plaintiffs sued for damages to their real estate resulting from the
construction and operation of the defendant's railroad. The plain-
tiffs alleged that they were the owners in fee of the property and
introduced as proof the will under which they obtained their title.
Upon construction of the devise contained in this will, the trial
court directed a verdict for the defendant since the plaintiffs had
not such estate in the property as to justify recovery upon the
evidence showing entire damage to the real estate. The defendant
contended that the plaintiffs each took a separate estate in the
several parts of the house damaged and that after that estate
expired, by the destruction of the house, they took a joint estate for
their lives in the property with the remainder passing to their
respective heirs. Under the earlier cases this construction would
have made numerous actions necessary for complete recovery.11 0
The Supreme Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs could
recover the entire damages in one action whether they owned in
fee or in the manner the defendant contended, because if the latter
were correct it would be "absolutely impossible" for the owners
of the separate interests to prove "any reasonable certain measure
of damages as a basis for a recovery" in separate actions and because
some of the owners of the separate interests were not even deter-
mined. All of the parties in being having an interest in the
property were permitted to join in one action and recover the
entire damages. The court said that they could apportion the
recovery among themselves, and in case they could not agree, the
court could decide for them.' 3' The court left open for future
129 87 W. Va. 548, 105 S. E. 780 (1921).
130 See earlier cases cited in note 97 supra.
131 Compare the problem discussed in the latter part of note 127 supra.
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decision the question of correctness on principle of the earlier
cases requiring separate actions by plaintiffs with separate interests
in property injured by one act of the defendant, but had this to
say of the instant decision: "This would make necessary only one
suit, would save the owners the expense and vexation of prosecuting
several suits, and the one who had inflicted the injury the like
expense of making defense to several suits."' 3
There was no dissent in the Curry case, but unfortunately
before the question next arose the judge who had written the
opinion in the Curry case and two other members of the court at
that time ceased to be members of the court.13' The question
next arose in Shaw v. Monongahela Ry. Co., 34 wherein were also
involved the common law rules both as to proper parties plaintiff
where a joint tenant dies after a cause of action accrues and where
one joint tenant assigns his right of action to another. At the
time the real property was damaged it was owned jointly by five
persons. When the action was brought two of the joint owners
had assigned their rights of action to one of the plaintiffs, 35 who
sued in his own name, and another of the original joint tenants
had died, leaving to survive her her husband and three children.
Her husband was also the person to whom the other original joint
tenants had made the assignments. In the action the original
joint tenants who had not assigned their rights joined with the
assignee and the persons holding through the deceased original
joint tenant. Applying the common law rules the court held that
there was a misjoinder of parties as plaintiffs, although the court
did state that the surviving joint tenants might maintain the
action for the benefit of themselves and the others interested
without joining the assignors for the use and benefit of the assignee.
No authority was cited for this permissible nonjoinder, 13 but the
court was unwilling to modify the other common law rules and
permit the joinder of all parties interested in the recovery of com-
plete damages. The liberal trend shown in the Curry case was
132 87 WT. Va. 548, 557, 105 S. E. 780, 783 (1921).
133 Judges Ritz, Poffenbarger, and Lynch.
14 100 W. Va. 366, 130 S. E. 461 (1925).
135, One of the joint owners had assigned his right of action to this plain-
tiff after the action was instituted, but to simplify the statement of facts it
is here stated that two of them had assigned their rights prior to the time the
action was instituted since the difference has no effect on the result reached
in the case.
1:38 The court seems to have forgotten that the assignors were also surviving
joint tenants.
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not extended, even though the court expressed dissatisfaction with
the existing rules of pleading as to each point decided. As to
nonjoinder of parties separately interested, Judge Hatcher, writing
the opinion, stated:
"Curry v. Ry. Co., 87 W. Va. 548, contains a dictum which
is not in accord with the Jordan and the Yeager cases .... The
argument of the dictum in the Curry case is plausible, and I
would be impressed by it if the proposition were a new one.
But it is in conflcit with one of the cardinal rules of pleading
relative to action ex delicto which has come to us from the
Common Law and the soundness of which is, according to
Hogg, 'self-evident'. . ..
Apparently the soundness of the rule was not so evident to Judge
Hatcher. Equally critical remarks were made concerning the other
rules applied, and concerning the decision generally the court
stated:
"It is apparent that this opinion is based solely on the
rules of Common Law pleading. Statutory systems of pleading
usually if not invariably require all of the real parties in
interest to be before the court. Equity procedure in this state
so requires. The dictum in Curry v. Ry. Co. supra, indicates
the trend of modern judicial thought when divorced from
Common Law restrictions. But the Constitution of this state
declares that the Common Law shall continue to be the law
until altered or repealed by the Legislature. Therefore this
court must uphold and require compliance with Common Law
pleading until it is so changed. It should not be modified or
disregarded because of supposed expediency or for other per-
sonal opinion of the court."'"38
This West Virginia case and those which have applied the same
rule' 39 prevent the joinder of plaintiffs who have separate interests
in the complete relief which would be sought against the defendant.
Separate actions are required. As stated in the Yeager case, "all
the plaintiffs must have an interest in the subject matter of the
action and in obtaining the relief demanded."' 40 This was also the
language of many of the codes on pleading, soon to be discussed.
It wAs often construed to mean that each plaintiff joined must have
an interest in all of the relief demanded, and the conjunctive word
137 100 W. Va. 368, 371, 130 S. E. 461, 462 (1925).
138 Id. at 374, 180 S. E. at 463.
139 Cases cited in note 97 supra.
240 48 W. Va. 259, 262, 27 S. E. 234, 235 (1897), quoting from 17 AM. & ENG.
ENc. LAw 588. Italics supplied.
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in the rule was emphasized.1 4 ' This interpretation defeats per-
missive joinder unless the court stresses the unity of the sum of
money sought to be recovered.142 (When even this is stressed, com-
plete decision concerning the case is not possible, for the respective
share of each plaintiff is not determined.)143 In part this narrow
interpretation is the result of reading into the rule the common
law arbitrary restrictions on joinder of "causes of action" or the
similar code pleading restrictions. 4 4 No consideration is given to
trial convenience.
An examination of the rules as to joinder of causes of action
will be helpful in explaining the limitations imposed thereby on
joinder of parties. In addition, it will show that to permit a
greater liberality in joinder of parties need not result in more
confusing issues for trial than is now possible. This examination
should indicate that the West Virginia rules have left both the
court and parties defendant open to worse abuses than would
a further liberalization of the rules of joinder as to both parties
and causes of action if discretion is vested in the trial court to limit
the issues to be tried at one time in settling the complete dispute.
E. Joinder of Causes of Action Between the Same Parties
in West Virginia Since 1931
In the problem of joining causes of action, questions analogous
to nonjoinder and misjoinder of parties arise. "Splitting a cause
of action" is analogous to nonjoinder and is a rule designed to
prevent a multiplicity of suits, unless the defendant assents
thereto,1 4' where similar questions would be involved in each
action. The numerous issues involved must be litigated; otherwise
the plaintiff must forfeit some of his rights. 46 Proper joinder of
141 CLARK, CODE PLEADING 365; 3 Mooa, FEDERAL PRACTICE 2716.
142 Ritzer v. Callen, 27 Kan. 339 (1882); Hudson v. Aman, 158 N. C. 360,
74 S. E. 97 (1912). In the latter case sureties on a sheriff's bond had been
compelled to pay in unequal amounts for the defalcation of the sheriff. The
court held that there was no misjoinder of parties plaintiff or causes of action.
Compare Curry v. Buckhannon & Northern R. R., supra note 129.
243 Cases cited in note 142 supra.
144 This is illustrated in the following sections of this paper. The treatment
here mentioned was equally applicable to defendants as it was to plaintiffs, and
the case most often cited to show the interrelation between the rules as to
joinder of parties and of causes is Ader v. Blau, 241 N. Y. 7, 148 N. E. 771, 41
A. L. R. 1216 (1925). See note 319 infra.
14r Holbert v. Safe Insurance Co., 114 W. Va. 221, 171 S. E. 422 (1933);
St. Lawrence Boom & Mfg. Co. v. Price, 49 W. Va. 432, 38 S. E. 526 (1901).
146 Armentrout v. Smith, 52 W. Va. 96, 43 S. E. 98 (1902); Ward v. Evans,
49 W. Va. 184, 38 S. E. 524 (1901); Hite v. Long, 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 457, 18 Am.
Dec. 719 (1828).
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causes of action will exist if the causes joined fall within the groups
which may be joined at common law or under the modified rules
of procedure. The problem is one of possible misjoinder, and is
the matter to be considered here. At common law a violation
of the rules was fatal to the plaintiff's action if raised by demurrer,
motion in arrest of judgment, or writ of error.'14 Under the West
Virginia statute advantage of a misjoinder of causes may be taken
only by demurrer, for it is cured after verdict; 48 and if a demurrer
is sustained, the declaration may be amended by eliminating either
group of misjoined counts. 49
Under the common law rules the scope of the subject matter
of the action was determined by the writ system and the forms of
action. These rules were important for they applied whether the
separate statements of facts or counts were joined to recover for
distinct causes of action or to meet possible variances in the proof
by giving different versions of the same cause of action.10 The
rules concerning joinability of counts in the declaration were so
conflicting that the pleader could rely only on precedent for a
safe test.' 5 ' The cases were confusing as to whether the process, the
form of action, the judgment or the plea which would be used for
the counts joined gave the controlling test.'a- This problem has
been further confused in West Virginia by the abolition of certain
147 1 CHITry, PLEADING *205.
148 W. VA. CODE c. 58, art. 1, §2 (Michie, 1949); Norfolk & W. R. R. v.
Wysor, 82 Va. '250 (1886) (joinder of tort and contract counts); see Fleming v.
Nay, 120 W. Va. 625, 629, 200 S. E. 577, 579 (1938); Malsby v. Lanark, 55 W, Va.
484, 486, 47 S. E. 358 (1904). Under the codes too advantage of this defect
must be taken at an early stage of the pleading.' CLARK, CODE PLEADING §72; 3
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTrCE 1806.
149 See the last paragraph of note 193 infra.
150 SHIPMAN, COMMON LAw PLEADING 79 (3d ed. Ballantine, 1923), citing
Gartin v. Draper Coal & Coke Co., 72 W. Va. 405, 78 S. E. 673 (1913). It may
be assumed for the purpose of this paper that the pleader sets forth the separate
statements of facts in separate counts and avoids the possibility of a count being
bad because of duplicity or double pleading. This defect was a formal defect
and was reached by a special demurrer. 'The latter having been abolished in
West Virginia, the remedy for such defect is a demand for specification of
grounds of the action or defense. Ibid.
151 Many of the precedents are collected in 1 CHITrY, PLEADING *199-*201;
Shipman, Common Law Pleading §80.
110 CLARK, CODE PLEADING §67, citing inter alia, Blume, A Rational Theory
for Joinder of Causes of Action, etc., 26 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1927); Sunderland,
Joinder of Actions, 18 MICH. L. REV. 571 (1920). Professor Sunderland demon-
strates that none of the criteria so often stated as the basis for a decision could
be relied upon to predict the result in the case of joinder of other counts, and
concludes that the common law created imaginary difficulties in joining actions.
Id. at 581.
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forms of action and the permissible use of alternative forms in
other cases.
The rules concerning permissive joinder of causes of action
may originally have been intended to prevent many diverse issues
in the same action and to avoid unduly complicating the trial.153
However, even under the common law rules various claims might
be joined even though based on groups of facts having no relation
to each other.' 4 An examination of the common law rules and the
extension of permissive joinder by statutory changes in West
Virginia will demonstrate that the rules can no longer prevent, if
they ever did, complexity and confusion at the trial if counsel for
the plaintiff chooses to take advantage of the rules. Such examina-
tion will also disclose that the existing rules continue to prevent
combining some claims even though the facts all arose from the
same transaction and are so closely interwoven than no confusion
at the trial would result from their joinder.
The rules also often prevent counsel from combining in his
declaration alternative theories concerning the law applicable or
the facts which he may be able to prove, especially important as
to the legal theory involved since he may not be permitted to
amend his declaration to embody a different theory.15 From this
viewpoint the rules produce an inconsistency since counsel is
privileged to state alternative legal theories or facts if the possible
variance can be stated in a form of action which is joinable.
Generally the West Virginia court purports to follow the com-
mon law rules concerning joinder of causes of action, but the con-
fusion noted in other jurisdictions1 6 exists concerning the criteria
to be used in deciding whether a misjoinder exists. Before dis-
cussing the West Virginia cases, it may be advisable to note the
statutory changes concerning the forms of action which must or
1253 Professor Sunderland questioned whether there really were any founda-
tions upon which the common law rules were based. Id. at 572. Professor
Moore states that the rationale underlying the common law rules was never
explained and that common law judges stated only the arbitrary rules. 3 MooR,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 1803.
154 1 CHrITrY, PLEADING *201; KEIGwiN, CAss ON COMMON LAW PLEADING
539 (2d ed. 1934); SIUPaAN, COMMON LAw PLEADING §80. Chitty points out
that where the plaintiff had two causes of action which might be joined, he
ought to bring one action only; and that if he did not, he might be compelled
to pay the costs of an application for consolidation.
15t Amendments and the theory of the pleadings will be discussed in a
forthcoming issue of this Review.
156 See text at page 168 supra.
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may be maintained, which statutes have in turn broadened the
common law rules on joinder of causes of action.
When this state was created the constitution provided that
the law of Virginia should be the law of this state, 157 and a Virginia
statute then provided that an action of trespass on the case might
be maintained wherever an action of trespass would lie.1", However,
trespass could not be maintained wherever trespass on the case
would lie.' 9 This statute was enacted to remove the hardships
which might arise from the nice distinctions between the cases in
which trespass was the proper action and those in which case was
proper. 160 However, in an early Virginia case, binding precedent
in West Virginia by virtue of the constitution, it had been decided
that even though this may have been the purpose of the statute,
it also would permit the joinder of any counts in trespass on the
case though some of the causes of action embodied therein would
have been proper only in trespass at common law.1"1 The common
law rule that would not permit a joinder of counts in trespass with
those in trespass on the case had been fortuitously changed.Ior
The only problem which remained was to determine whether
the counts for which trespass would have been proper had been
made counts in trespass on the case. If the process were in case
and the declaration were wholly in case, no difficulty would be
157 W. VA. CoNsr. Art. XI, §8 (1863). Compare W. VA. CONsT. Art. VIII, §21;
W. VA. CODE c. 2, art. 2, §1 (Michie, 1949).
I5 VA. CODE c. 148, §7 (1860). Compare W. VA. CODE c. 103, §8 (Barnes,
1923).
19 Barnum v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 5 W. Va. 10 (1871).
160 Parsons v. Harper, 57 Va. (16 Gratt.) 64, 72 (1860). Typical of the
nice distinctions which had to be drawn to determine whether trepass or
trespass on the case was the proper form of action was the difference between
the injury inflicted having been direct or consequential. The distinction was
often so fine drawn that the courts began to use reasoning which would justify
the bringing of either form of action. For example, through negligence a
vehicle is caused to strike forcibly another, injuring the vehicle and the
occupant. If the negligence of the driver is treated as the cause of action,
trespass on the case was proper; but if the act itself is treated as the cause of
action, trespass was proper. SHIPMAN, COMMON LAW PLEADING 88.
161 Parsons v. Harper, 57 Va. (16 Gratt.) 64 (1860); accord, Galizian v.
Henry, 71 W. Va. 292, 76 S. E. 440 (1912); Lively v. Ballard, 2 W. Va. 496
(1868); Beckwith v. Mollohan, 2 W. Va. 477 (1868).
16 BuRKs, PLEADING & PRACTICE 893; SHIPMAN, COMMON LAw PLEADING 203.
Whether fortuitous or not, the change was a step in the right direction. The
logic in permitting such joinder is emphasized by Professor Moore when he
points out that the former rule would prevent such joinder even though the
two counts were only variations in presenting the underlying operative facts,
being nothing more than different statements of the same cause of action.
2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1804.
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experienced.1 3 If the process were in trespass or only some of the
counts were in case, difficulty might have arisen for the statute did
not authorize joinder of trespass and case counts.6 4 This difficulty
in determining whether trespass and case counts are joined should
not arise under the present statute which requires an action of
trespass on the case to be used wherever trespass would have been
proper at common law. " However, similar problems may arise
under a West Virginia statute which permits, but does not require,
an action of debt or assumpsit to be maintained on any note or
writing, whether sealed or not, by which there is a promise or
obligation to pay money, if the writing be signed by the party who
is to be charged thereby. 6 This statute permits assumpsit where
163 Said the court in Pqrsons v. Harper, 57 Va. (16 Gratt.) 64, 72 (1860):
'... as the action is case, and the declaration purports in its introduction, to be
wholly in case, those counts for the matters of which it is said trespass would
lie, may be considered counts in case with as much propriety, as counts in
trespass."
164 If the process were in trespass and some or all of the counts were in
trespass on the case, the defendant could take advtantage of the variance in the
writ from the declaration only by a plea in abatement. Beckwith v. Mollohan,
2 W. Va. 477 (1868). The present statute so provides and in addition provides
that the court may permit the plaintiff to umend the writ so as to correct such
a variance whether it was the subject of a plea in abatement or not. W. VA.
CODE c. 56, art. 4, §30 (Michie, 1949).,
If the process were in trespass on the case but some of the counts in the
declaration were in trespass and others were in trespass on the case, it was
not clear whether the court would have held the declaration to be one in
trespass under some circumstances and that the case counts were therefore
improperly joined. In the first case in which the question arose, the court
dismissed a contention that the declaration was demurrable, since it contained
counts applicable either to trespass or case, by stating that there was no cause
for demurrer for this reason under the statute permitting case to be used where
trespass was formerly proper. Beckwith v. Mollohan, 2 W. Va. 477, 481 (1868).
In another case in which the same contention was made, the court avoided the
problem by deciding that all of the counts were counts in trespass. Elk Garden
Big Vein Coal Mining Co. v. Gerstell, 95 W. Va. 471, 473, 121 S. E. 569 (1924).
In most of the cases in which the question of such joinder arose, the court
merely held that the causes of action were joinable by virtue of the statute,
and stated in the syllabus that the declaration was in trespass on the case.
E.g., Coal Land Development Co. v. Chidester, 86 W. Va. 561, 103 S. E. 923
(1920); Galizian v. Henry, 71 W. Va. 292, 76 S. E. 440 (1912).
165 W. VA. CODE c. 55, art. 7, §10 (Michie, 1949). It seems probable that a
demurrer would be sustained to a declaration in trespass even though that
were the proper form of action at common law. Under the statute when it
permitted case where trespass would have been proper at common law, the
court held that a demurrer would be sustained to a declaration in trespass
where the proper form of action at common law was case. Barnum v. Baltimore
& Ohio R. R., 5 W. Va. 10 (1871). An equally literal interpretation of the
present statute would make a declaration in trespass improper today even
though proper at common law.
166 W. VA. CODE c. 55, art. 8, §2 (Michie, 1949).
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only covenant may have been proper at common law'67 and seems
also to permit an action of debt where it would not have been
proper at common law.16 Another statute is even broader in
allowing an action of assumpsit where covenant would have been
proper at common law. It permits an action of assumpsit in all
cases to recover damages for the breach of any contract in writing
whether under seal or not.'8 9 The statute which abolished replevin
probably does not affect joinder of causes of action.170 At common
law the action of detinue included those cases where replevin was
proper, namely, where there had been an unlawful taking.171
Accordingly, the plaintiff even at common law perhaps could join
counts in debt when suing for a wrongful taking if he used counts
in detinue rather than in replevin.'"
167 "The action of covenant lies for the iecovery of damages for breach
of a covenant, that is, a promise under seal, whether the damages are liquidated
or unliquidated. When the damages are unliquidated it is the only proper
form of action." SHIPMAN, COMMON LAw PLEADING §55.
168 Even at common law the idea that debt would only lie where the
amount due is fixed or can be reduced to a certainty by mathematical com-
putation was expanded to include obligations to pay the reasonable value of
services or goods even though this value was not fixed by the parties. SHIPMAN,
COMMON LAw PLEADING §54. This expansion was needed in order that common
counts might 'be used in the action of debt. At common law there remained
many cases in which debt could not be maintained though the promise was
"to pay money", for example, to indemnify against loss by fire or to pay a
debt out of a particular fund. Ibid.
169 W. VA. CODE c. 55, art. 8, §3 (Michie, 1949). Note that there is no
limitation in this section that the action be on a writing by which there is a
promise to pay money. Compare id. §2, supra note 166.
170 W. VA. CODE c. 55, art. 7, §4 (Michie, 1949). This section merely
abolishes the action of replevin, and does not provide that another form
of action shall be used where replevin was formerly proper. Compare W. VA.
CODE c. 55, art. 7, §10 (Michie, 1949), supra note 165. This was unnecessary
since detinue would have been the logical alternative form of action, and that
form of action was a proper alternative at common law. See note 171 infra.
The relief available in an action of detinue was modified to give the plaintiff
some of the advantages which might have been obtained in an action of
replevin at common law. W. VA. CODE c. 55, art. 6 (Michie, 1949); Note, 32
W. VA. L. Q. 187 (1926).
171 Replevin was proper where specific personal property had been wrong-
fully taken and was wrongfully detained. SHIPMAN, COMMON LAw PLEADING §49.
The gist of the action of detinue is the wrongful detention of specific personal
property, and some of the older books state that the action can not be main-
tained where the defendant took the goods tortiously. Id. §48.
172 Since detinue evolved from the action of debt, counts in these two
forms of action can be joined at common law even though the pleas are
different and the judgments are in different forms. At common law counts
in replevin could not be properly joined with counts in any other form of
action. CLARu, CODE PLEADING 436, n. 4; SHIPMAN, COMMON LAw PLEADING §80.
See the question raised in note 185 infra as to joining debt lnd detinue if the
latter sounds in tort.
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The scope of this expansion of the cases in which joinder of
causes is now permissible in West Virginia can be seen from an
examination, even though brief, of the cases in which joinder
was permissible at common law. Some of the extensions have
already been before the Supreme Court of Appeals, and little
imagination is needed to predict the result in other cases if the
court follows, as it probably will, the reasoning used in the cases
already decided. At common law all of the various types of tres-
passes, both to the person and to property, might be joined in the
same declaration.' 73 Also, several causes of action in trespass on the
case might be joined with trover,174 the breadth of this permissible
joinder being great because trespass on the case is the residuary
action at common law. 17 5 The earlier statute permitting case where
trespass was proper at common law17 6 had been applied to the
combination of trover, trespass, and case. Under that statute it
was held that causes originally proper in trespass could be joined
with causes proper in case; 7 7 and along with either or both of
those types, causes proper in trover could be joined. 78 In brief, the
statute permitted any cause of action sounding in tort, except those
173 1 CHIryv PLEADING *200; SHI AN, COMMON LA%v PLEADING §202.
174 Spencer v. Pilcher, 35 Va. (8 Leigh) 565 (1887); 1 CHITTY, PLEADING
*200; SHIPMAN, COMMON LAW PLEADING 202. This was one of the two exceptions
to the rule that counts in different forms of action could not be joined, the
other being that debt and detinue counts could be joined. Both exceptions
were based upon the fact that one of the two forms of action developed
historically from the other. ATKINSON & CHADBOURN, CASES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE
142, n. 6 (1948); CLARK, CODE PLEADING 436 n. 4.
275 The action of trespass on the case arose under the statute of Westminster
II which authorized the clerks in chancery to frame new writs in consimili casu
with writs already known. These writs came to be viewed as a new form of
action comprised of different species. Of these species two came to be known
as trespass on the case "in assumpsit" and "in trover". All others, which were
used less frequently, were known as "case". There was no strict limit to the
action, and it was the authority invoked in extending tort liability. SHiPmAN,
COMMON LAW PLEADING §88. But see Plucknett, Case and the Statute of West-
minster II, 31 COL. L. REv. 778 (1931). Because of confusion in terminology
the code revisers changed the technical name of the action of trespass on the
case in assumpsit to action of assumpsit. W. VA. CODE c. 55, art. 8, §3 (Michie,
1949).
170 See note 158 supra.
'77 Parsons v. Harper, 57 Va. (16 Gratt.) 64 (1860).
178 Hood v. Maxwell, 1 W. Va. 219 (1866). This case held that counts in
trover could be joined with a count in case which count 'Alas proper in case
only by virtue of the statute permitting case where trespass had been proper
at common law. Although trespass and case could not be joined at common
law, case and trover could be; therefore, by using case for the causes of action
in which trespass formerly had to be used, causes of action proper at common
law in trespass, case or trover might be joined.
37
Lugar: Common Law Pleading Modified versus the Federal Rules
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1950
COMMON LAW PLEADING
in which the plaintiff sought to obtain possession of property,17 9
to be joined. That this expansion of joinder was not the purpose
of the statute has been shown. s0
This scope of joinder in the tort field is automatic now that
the plaintiff must bring his action in case wherever case or trespass
was proper at common law.18 ' In the contract field, the plaintiff
has the option of many joinders if he chooses the proper process and
form for his declaration., s2 Under the common law system he might
join as many causes as he wished if they could be maintained in
assumpsit, whether general or special assumpsit;' 8 ' and likewise,
he could join as many causes as he desired if they could be main-
tained in debt, whether on a sealed or simple or implied contract
or on a judgment.184 He might also join counts in debt and detinue,
though probably only if the latter sounded in contract.'" At com-
mon law he could not join counts in assumpsit with covenant,"",
but under the West Virginia statutes if he elects to use assumpsit
on a sealed contract,'8 7 he is in a position to combine counts for
179 Ejectment and unlawful entry and detainer for real property, and
detinue and replevin for personal property, were the only tort actions which
could not be joined.
180 See text at page 170 supra.
181 W. VA. CODE c. 55, art. 7, §10 (Michie, 1949). See also note 165 supra.
180 See note 164 supra as to this problem under the statute which permitted
case where trespass was proper. On this point it must be remembered that
even at common law the plaintiff could widen the scope of permissive joinder
of causes by arrangement and selection of facts, or by the use of fictions, to
cast his action in different forms. By these means he could set up a cause of
action indifferently as one in case or assumpsit, debt or assumpsit, trover or
replevin, assumpsit or trover, trespass or case, or debt or covenant. Sunderland,
supra note 152, at 576.
183 Homer v. Speed, 2 Pat. & H. 616 (Va. 1857) (special assumpsit with
special assumpsit); Kennaird v. Jones, 50 Va. (9 Gratt.) 183 (1852) (general
assumpsit with special assumpsit); 1 CHITTY, PLEADING *200; SHIPMAN, COMMON
LAW PLEADING 202.
184 Somerville v. Grim, 17 W. Va. 803 (1881) (debt on a single bill joined
with the common counts); Eib v. Pindall's Ex'r, 32 Va. (5 Leigh) 109 (1834)
(debt on a specialty and a simple contract); I CHITrY, PLEADING *200; SIIPMAN,
COMMON LAW PLEADING 202. Note that this joinder is permitted even though
the pleas are different. The general issue in debt on simple contracts and
'statutes is "nil debet", on a specialty it is "non est factum", and on judgments
it is "nul tiel record". SHIPMAN, COMMON LAW PLEADING §§184-186.
185 1 CHITrY, PLEADING *200; SHIPMAN, COMMON LAW PLEADING §80. Note
that this joinder is permitted though the judgments are different, that in
detinue being at common law in the ialternative for either the goods or their
value. Shipman takes the position that detinue and debt may be joined even
though this be an exception to the general rule that actions ex contractu cannot
be joined with those in form ex delicto. Chitty takes the position that the
joinder of these two forms is permissible only if both be founded on contract,
citing Tidd. See TDD, PRACTICE *11 n. b.
186 See citations in note 185 supra.
187 The statutes are cited in notes 166 and 169 supra.
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any causes of action for which assumpsit is proper, including
counts under the statute on other sealed contracts.1 s8 Likewise,
under the statute he may use an action of debt even though the
obligation on the contract to pay money is not for a sum certain
or capable of being made certain 8 " and combine with that cause
claims for which debt is proper at common law and also claims
for recovery in detinue,'5 0 including perhaps those claims in which
an action in replevin would have been proper at common law.19
In brief, any causes of actions, including those for recovery of
personal property but excluding those for recovery of real property,
may be joined as long as actions ex contractu are not joined with
those ex delicto.]9'
All of these joinders of causes of action are permitted without
any discretion in the trial court to eliminate confusion by requiring
a severance or separation of the many possible issues for trial con-
venience. Contrariwise, a limitation on joinder which the court
has steadfastly maintained and which has caused reversals or delays
in many cases is that actions ex contractu cannot be joined with
those ex delicto.19" If it were always clear before trial what facts
188 Analogy drawn from the cases which permitted joinder of causes proper
in trespass and case at common law under the West Virginia statute which
formerly permitted case to be maintained where trespass was proper at common
law. See notes 157-164 supra and the text to which those notes are appended.
189 See notes 166, 168, and 188 supra.
190 See notes 185 and 188 supra.
191 See notes 170-172, 185 and 188 supra.
1 2 Caveat as to detinue if based on a wrongful taking. See note 185 supra.
In this summary the writer has omitted the action of account which lies where
one has received goods or money for another in a fiduciary capacity, to ascertain
and recover the balance due. It lies where there is an obligation to account,
and the amount due is uncertain and unliquidated. SHIPMAN, CONMON LAW
PLEADING §56. Although this action has not been abolished in West Virginia,
it seems to be obsolete. The common counts in assumpsit or a bill in equity
for an accounting seems to have taken its place. See, however, W. VA. CODE c.
55, art. 8, §13 (Michie, 1949).
103 Shepherd v. Pocahontas Transportation Co., 100 W. Va. 703, 131 S. E.
548 (1926) (tort with common counts); O'Neal v. Pocahontas Transportation
Co., 99 W. Va. 456, 129 S. E. 478 (1925) (tort with common counts); Shafer v.
Security Trust Co., 82 W. Va. 618, 97 S. E. 290 (1918) (case with common
counts); Creel v. Brown, 40 Va. (I Rob.) (1842) (case with assumpsit). As
stated by Judge Lynch in Shafer v. Security Trust Co., supra at 621, 97 S. E. at
291: "The rule forbidding joinder of counts in assumpsit and tort is well
established, so well indeed as not to provoke elaborate argument or need much
citation of authority. It is elementary, and, if infringed, makes the declaration
subject to successful challenge by demurrer."
Although the rule is well established, it is not always clear whether
the counts will be treated as being both in tort or contract, or one in tort and
the other in contract. Much may depend upon slight differences in the
allegations therein. Compare Shafer v. Security Trust Co., supra, where one
count was held to be in tort since the allegation that the defendant "undertook
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would be established, 94 some justification for this limitation might
be made if joinder of counts be merely to meet possible variances
in proof, but it seems questionable whether a client should be
required to suffer the delay necessary for a new action when the
legal theory on which any recovery might have been obtained was
not clearly in tort or on contract. Should the claim have been
asserted on the theory of breach of contract or on the basis that
tort liability existed?195 If the problem resolves itself into one solely
to sell" was not, when considered with the other averments, deemed equivalent
to an allegation that the defendant "undertook", with Hill v. Ansted National
Bank, 95 W. Va. 649, 123 S. E. 417 (1924), where both counts were held to be
in tort, the one count being "in form ex contract u" but it did not directly
allege "an undertaking" by the defendant. See Maloney v. Barr, 27 W. Va.
381 (1886), in which the common counts were joined with two special counts,
and the court held that the second of the special counts was in assumpsit
because the general conclusion of the declaration was a part of that count
and in the conclusion an express promise to pay was averred. The court
concedes that otherwise the count averred that the defendant's liability arose
from a tort. Id. at 384. No contention was made that the first of the special
counts was improperly joined, but unless it was made a count in assumpsit
by this same line of reasoning, it appears to be a count in debt and improperlyjoined with assumpsit at common law. See also McKay v. Ohio River R. R.,
34 W. Va. 65, 11 S. E. 737 (1890); BURKS, PLEADING & PRACTICE §99 (3d ed. 1934).
One should remember that even this rule does not prevent the plaintiff
from joining the same causes of action if he casts his actions in different forms
of action. See note 182 supra. The real limitation imposed by this rule is
the denial of a right to the plaintiff to recover for any cause of action in one
action if the facts proved or the theory of law determined to be applicable
in the litigation shows a right to recovery in a contract form when the plaintiff's
counsel originally and perhaps justifiably thought the right could be more
easily shown in a tort form of action, or vice versa. An excellent illustration
of the problem may be found in Schaffner v. National Supply Co., 80 W. Va.
111, 92 S. E. 580 (1917), wherein the plaintiff was permitted to join a count
for false warranty with a count for deceit. . The action -as in case for both
counts, and the joinder was proper on the basis of precedents holding that
an action for false warranty may be brought in either assumpsit or case. These
precedents are based on the historical development of the action of assumpsit
through trespass on the case, in which development reliance was placed on a
fiction of deceit where there was no "undertaking" by the defendant. AMES,
LEcTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 140-145 (1913). For other causes where the
plaintiff has no such election to make his action sound in either tort or contract,
such joinder is not permitted although it may be equally desirable.
The plaintiff may amend the declaration by eliminating either group of
misjoined counts; and when so amended, the writ may be changed to conform
to the amendment. O'Neal v. Pocahontas Transportation Co., supra at 460,
129 S. E. at 479; Shafer v. Security Trust Co., supra at 622, 97 S. E. at 291, and
the cases cited therein. This procedure offers no solution for the problem.
This point will be discussed more fully in a forthcoming issue of this Review.
194 The trial lawyer needs no citation of incidents to demonstrate that
this is seldom the case. The layman has been well advised of the uncertainty
concerning "facts". FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL (1949), especially the chapter
therein entitled, "Facts Are Guesses".
195 For example, see McKay v. Ohio River R. R., 34 W. Va. 65, 11 S. E.
737 (1890), in which the plaintiff recovered a judgment for $539.17 for damages
sustained as a result of having been ejected by a conductor without unnecessary
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of factual uncertainty and the possibilities can be set forth in
counts which are joinable, the plaintiff can protect himself against
the variance in proof;198 but even this he can not do if the alterna-
tive facts must be set forth in a count which is not joinable.197
Further, what may be set forth as an apparent fact variance in the
allegations of different counts of a declaration may in reality be
needed only to meet a variance in the possible theory of recovery. 98
Have these limitations on the forms of action which may be
joined been further restricted on the basis that the causes joined
must have a common relationship? This question was never clearly
answered by the well known commentators on common law plead-
ing. They frequently stated that the causes joined must be "of the
same nature", but no distinction was drawn except on the basis
of the forms of action which might be joined according to common
law precedents. Causes "of the same nature" seems to have meant
only that the forms of action were joinable. 9 9 The problem here is
to determine whether the West Virginia court has adopted any ad-
ditional limitation to prevent free joinder of any causes within the
possibilities already developed. If not, counsel may take advantage
of the statutory liberalization to confuse issues at the trial200 even
though he might be barred from recovery in one action for one
cause of action by the restrictions which remain.
In Galizian v. Heny,2 1 in permitting joinder of a cause of
force, the plaintiff having been mistakenly given a ticket in the wrong direction
by the agent and having refused to pay another fare when the conductor
refused to recognize the ticket. Judgment reversed. Held: the action must be
based on the breach of contract of carriage and no recovery can be allowed in
an action of trespass on the case. This result was reached even though the
court conceded that if the declaration had been in assumpsit, the evidence
would have sustained the action. Id. at 68, 11 S. E. at 738. Should a plaintiff
be denied recovery when the facts show that he is entitled to recover, and the
defendant has not been surprised at the trial, simply because the pleadings have
been labeled on the basis of a different theory of law?
1906 Shafer v. Western Maryland Ry., 93 W. Va. 300, 116 S. E. 747 (1923);
Maloney v. Barr, 27 W. Va. 381 (1886); Somerville v. Grim, 17 W. Va. 803 (1881);
Homer v. Speed, 2 Pat. & H. 616 (Va. 1857).
197 Wells v. Kanawha & M. Ry. 78 W. Va. 762, 90 S. E. 337 (1916).
109 Shafer v. Western Maryland Ry., 93 W. Va. 300, 116 S. E. 747 (1923).
109 E.g., BumRs, PLEADING & PRACrICE §§99, 482; SHIPMAN, COMMON LAw
PLEADING §80. These statements can be traced to Chitty, where they seem to
have no different meaning. 1 Cmirry, PLEADING *200, *201.
200 The trial court in West Virginia has no power to separate or sever
the issues for trial purposes. Federal courts may. See text at pages 200, 206
infra.
201 71 W. Va. 292, 76 S. E. 440 (1912); followed in Harper v. Harper, 252
Fed. 39 (1918).
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action for malicious prosecution and one for false imprisonment,
the court said:
"Nor is there a misjoinder of counts rendering the declara-
tion bad as a whole. By statute trespass on the case lies in any
case proper for trespass vi et armis at common law, and these
two causes of action grow out of the same transaction, involving
substantially the same evidence. Hence joinder thereof is
clearly allowable ..... 212
The court cited as authority for these statements the earlier cases
which had held such causes of action properly joinable without any
limitation as to whether they grew out of the same transaction or
involved substantially the same evidence.20 3 In fact, the reasoning
in the earlier cases would refute any such limitation, for the deci-
sions were based entirely upon the fact that the statute permitted
case where trespass was proper at common law; the result following
that such causes of action being properly asserted in case counts,
they might be joined as freely as causes properly asserted only in
case counts at common law. The limitation therefore seems to be
dictum, the court merely intending to emphasize that on these
facts the joinder was "clearly allowable".
In Pan Coal Co. v. Garland Pocahontas Coal Co.,- 4 a similar
comment was made by the court, although the action unlike that in
the Galizian case involved only a question of permissible joinder
without the aid of the statute. The plaintiff sued to recover the
value of coal taken from its premises and for damages for the injury
done to its unmined coal. The court stated:
". .. That the two demands are joined in the same
declaration makes no difference. They grow out of the same
tort; that one count in effect is in trespass de bonis asportatis,
that is, for carrying away part of plaintiff's coal, and the other
in trespass quare clausum fregit, that is, for breaking and
entering plaintiff's premises and doing injury to other of
plaintiff's coal, is not objectionable .......
202 71 W. Va. 292, 293, 76 S. E. 440 (1912). Italics for second group of
words supplied.
203 Cases cited in note 161 supra.
-04 97 W. Va. 368, 125 S. E. 226 (1924); cf. Thalman v. Schultze, 111 W. Va.
64, 160 S. E. 303 (1931).
20.5 Id. at 373, 125 S. E. at 228. Italics supplied. Apparently these two causes
could have been joined in one count of trespass quare clausum fregit, the taking
and carrying away of the coal being alleged by way of aggravation. COOK, READ-
INGS ON THE FORMS OF AarioN AT COMON LAw 71 n. 28 (1940). Other types of
trespass could also be alleged by way of aggravation. Id. at 55 n. 24. Comparablejoinder of causes of action has been permitted generally by statutes which per-
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Here again the emphasis was upon the joinder of trespass counts,
which was proper at common law, and reference to the same trans-
action being involved in each count was a factual statement rather
than a legal limitation.
Application of the rules in other cases leaves no doubt bnt
that they permit joinder even though the causes arose from widely
separated groups of facts. For example, in Coal Land Development
Co. v. Chidester, 21\' the plaintiff joined two independent causes of
action, one for an assault and battery by the defendant upon one of
the plaintiff's agents while in the course of his employment and the
other for slander against it as a corporate entity. The defendant's
demurrer for a misjoinder of counts in the declaration was over-
ruled.
In another case,",7 the same principle was applied, although
the acts of the defendant were apparently not as distinctly separate
transactions as they seem to have been in the Chidester case. Here
the plaintiff sought to recover damages from two acts of the
defendant, one being the construction of a huge fill partly on the
plaintiff's land and the other being the construction of a roof on
defendant's house, located on the lot where the remainder of the
fill was made, in such manner as to collect water and cast it on the
plaintiff's lot. The court, in justifying the joinder of the latter cause
of action, said:
"... This may be regarded as an act separate and distinct
from the construction of the embankment and wall, but it
was done by the same party and upon the same premises and
works injury of the same kind, for which reasons we see no
valid objection to the inclusion thereof in the declaration
along with the other acts complained of."' 8
Although the language sounds somewhat restrictive, the caution
seems to relate to proper joinder of parties rather than to a limita-
tion on joinder of forms.?' 9 In other cases where joinder of forms
has been permitted, the court has more clearly reserved for future
mit the plaintiff to join his claim for mesne profits in an action to recover pos-
sessions of real property. E.g. W. VA. CODE c. 55, art. 4, §21 (Michie, 1949) (eject-
ment); W. VA. CODE c. 55, art. 3, §2 (Michie, 1949) (unlawful entry or detainer).
In the absence of statutory authorization for joinder, the plaintiff was required
to bring a separate action of trespass for the mesne profits after he had recovered
possession of the property, CooK, supra at 79 n. 32.
266 86 W. Va. 561, 103 S. E. 923 (1920).
A,7 Lyons v. Fairmont Real Estate Co., 71 W. Va. 754, 77 S. E. 525 (1912).
-,s Id. at 757, 77 S. E. at 527. Italics supplied.
209 Limitations on the joinder of causes by virtue of the difference in
parties involved are discussed in the text at page 181 infra.
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decision whether joinder of the forms of action would be permitted
if the problem of proper joinder of parties was present.210
Since the court seems never to have held that the joinder of
forms of action is controlled also by the causes having arisen from
the same transaction, statements recognizing this fact made in cases
where the forms of action were properly joined may indicate that
the court would favor such a limitation. This is a limitation found
in code pleading.2"
The West Virginia court has frequently Tnade other vague
statements concerning the scope of permissible joinder of counts.
It has stated that to be joinable the causes of action must be of
"similar quality or character", 2 1 2 "of the same general nature"
21 s
and that the form of action in each, if asserted separately, would
be "the same and admit of the same plea and judgment".1 4 How-
ever, the court has held that the pleas may be different if the
judgment is the same in each. 1 " In addition to applying the rule
to permit joinder of causes arising from different transactions,V°
the court has stated that the rule is not so limited.'u One may
assume therefore that these general statements have reference to
the problem of what forms of action are joinable based on prece-
dents0 s8 and have no limiting effect on the groups of facts from
which the various causes of action arise.
The West Virginia court has also been concerned with what
Professor Sunderland included in the second class of cases in which
2!10 E.g. Shafer v. Western Maryland Ry., 93 W. Va. 300, 307, 116 S. E. 747,
750 (1923); cf. Thalman v. Schultze, 111 W. Va. 64, 68, 160 S. E. 303, 304 (1931).
211 See text at page 202 infra.
Z12 Shafer v. Western Maryland Ry., 93 W. Va. 300, 306, 116 S. E. 747, 749
(1923).
213 Coal Land Development Co. v. Chidester, 86 W. Va. 561, 565, 103 S. E.
923, 925 (1920).
214 Ibid. Language to the same effect from Chitty and Hogg is quoted with
approval in Wells v. Kanawha & M. Ry., 78 W. Va. 762, 763, 90 S. E. 337 (1916),
although the quotation from Hogg concedes that there need not be the same
pleas. See note 215 infra.
215 Cases cited note 184 supra. Hogg and Burks are quoted to the same ef-
fect in Beuke v. Boggs Run Mining & M. Co., 100 W. Va. 141, 146, 130 S. E. 132,
134 (1925) and Shafer v. Western Maryland Co., 93 W. Va. 300, 306, 116 S. E.
747, 749 (1923), respectively..
216 Cases cited notes 20 and 207 supra.
217 "He may join a claim of debt on a bond with a claim of debt on simple
contract or any number of such claims, in the same suit, and whether they grew
out of the same or different transactions." Shafer v. Western Maryland Ry., 93
W. Va. 300, 306, 116 S. E. 747, 749 (1923). Compare note 224 infra,
218 The scope of permissive joinder within these precedents, as aided by
statutory changes as to the forms of action, has been discussed and criticized in
this paper. See text at pages 168-177 supra.
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the common law discovered a misjoinder of causes of action,
namely, misjoinder resulting from diversity of capacities or rights
in which the same parties sue or are sued in the several causes
joined.!"" This misjoinder results irrespective of the forms of action
which are joined.
Typical of the cases in which the problem arose is Malsby v.
Lanark Co.,2z° wherein the plaintiff joined three counts in assump-
sit in his declaration, two of which alleged causes of action accruing
to the plaintiff in his own right and the other count alleged a
contract between the defendant and the partnership of which
the plaintiff was a member. This was held to be a misjoinder of
counts for an individual demand could not be joined with a
partnership demand, neither partner being dead. That the rule
also applies to defendants was held in Kellar v. fames,221 where the
plaintiff joined a cause of action against the husband and one
against the husband and wife. Joinder was not permitted because
a recovery on the declaration "would make the wife liable for the
husband's tort."
That either the application of this principle or the rule pre-
venting a joinder of certain forms of action will be equally fatal
to a declaration on demurrer is indicated in Hunter v. Gore.22
Here the plaintiff, as a de jure officer, sought to recover against a
de facto officer and certain sureties on a bond which he had
executed when he entered into said office. The declaration con-
tained the common counts declaring upon a joint promise and a
special count which the court treated as being upon an implied
promise without any allegation to show that the sureties received
210 Sunderland, Joinder of Actions, 18 MICH. L. REV. 571, 575 (1920). Chitty
stated the rule to be that "a person cannot in the same action join a demand in
his own right, and a demand as representative of another, or autre droit; nor
demands against a person on his own liability, and on his liability in his repre-
sentative capacity." 1 CmTTY, PLEADING *201. Caveat: for injuries to property
committed after the death of the intestate, an administrator may sue in his
own name. Kent v. Bothwell, 152 Mass. 341, 25 N. E. 721 (1890).
22b 55 W. Va. 484, 47 S. E. 358 (1904); see Larzo v. Swift & Co., 129 W. Va.
436, 443, 40 S. E.2d 811, 815 (1946). Compare Logan Central Coal Co. v. Coun-
ty Court of Logan County, 106 W. Va. 578, 146 S. E. 371 (1929) and the criticism
thereof in text at page 159 supra.
22' 63 W. Va. 139, 59 S. E. 939 (1907); accord, Hunter v. Gore, 105 W. Va. 1,
141 S. E. 393 (1928); Knotts v. McGregor, 47 W. Va. 566, 35 S. E. 899 (1900)
(cause against the decedent's estate with cause against personal representative
individually). The defect is fatal on demurrer; but if there be no demurrer, the
defect is cured after verdict by virtue of statute, and after demurrer sustained
the plaintiff may amend his declaration by electing which cause he will proceed
upon. Id. at 574, 35 S. E. at 902. Compare also note 193 supra.
2 105 V. Va. 1, 141 S. E. 393 (1928).
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any part of the emoluments of the office. Therefore, since the
special count was good only as to the principal defendant and
not as to the sureties, the declaration contained a misjoinder of
causes of action. The court applied this reasoning:
". .. The general rule is that in order that causes of
action against several defendants may be joined, they must
each affect all of the defendants. It is also true that a cause
of action upon which defendants are jointly liable cannot be
joined with another upon which one of the defendants alone is
liable.... Then again, the special count may be said to be in
the nature of one sounding in tort, which would likewise
render the declaration demurrable, since the first count sounds
in contract .... 223
From this examination it appears that through a desire to
eliminate technicalities as to the form of action that must be used,
not causing cases to be thrown out of court on the nice distinctions
which existed at common law, the plaintiff has been fortuitously
given a wide range of possible ways in which he may in some cases
combine different causes of action or state one cause in various
ways to meet the proof. However, since the latter considerations
were not the objectives of the statutes, in many cases the plaintiff
has not been permitted to state his case so that he may avoid
difficulties at the trial stage when he is in doubt concerning the
facts which may be proved or the law which will be held applicable.
In addition, no cognizance of trial convenience has been indicated.
Often two or more trials are needed even though the causes all
flow from one transaction and require practically the same evidence
to prove each of them, although the rules permit other causes
2V3 Id. at 3, 141 S. E. at 393. Compare, however, the court's attempt to dis-
tinguish this case in Gilkerson v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 129 W. Va. 649, 660,
41 S. E.2d 188, 195 (1946). In the latter case the counts in the declaration alleg-
ed joint liability against all of the defendants, but one count failed to show a
duty except as to one defendant. This count was held demurrable, but the
court held that its joinder with the other counts did not make the declaration
demurrable. The Hunter case was distinguished on the basis that it involved
contract liability whereas the instant case was an action of tort in which case
liability is generally both joint and several, not as in contract actions where there
may be either, but not both, joint and several liability. The basis for the de-
cision in the Hunter case would make the declaration demurrable, whether in
contract or tort action, if each count did not affect all of the parties. The later
case can be reconciled only by treating the faulty count as nonexistent. The
Virginia court held that in an action for malicious prosecution counts against
several defendants jointly could not be joined with counts against each defend-
ant severally, citing Chitty to the effect that all causes joined must be stated
to be joint, whether ex contractu or ex delicto. McMullin v. Church, 82 Va.
501 (1886).
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flowing from entirely separate and distinct occurrences to be heard
at the same time.224 In no case is the court empowered to separate
the issues for trial, even if the plaintiff has taken advantage of the
existing rules to join many diversified causes to introduce com-
plexity into the trial. At the same time counsel is not permitted to
join claims growing out of the same transaction, if the rules are
not satisfied, irrespective of how conveniently the issues might be
resolved at the trial stage.
F. Interrelation of Parties and Causes of Action
on Joinder Problem
The restrictive rules on joinder of parties often prevent
joinder of causes at law where there are multiple parties, even
though the forms of action can be joined. The substantive rights
or duties of the parties determine whether the actions can be
joined. Thus, no consideration is given to trial convenience. Per-
missive joinder is not affected by a common question of law or
fact being involved..22 5 On the other hand, in equity the question
of trial convenience is considered as the test subject to the rules
on multifariousness, which are not arbitrary as at law but rest in
the discretion of the trial court with the objective of settling the
entire controversy in one suit.2 26 The approach in equity results
2i4 Even without the extension as to joinder of forms of action permitted by
the West Virginia statutes, the common law went far in this direction. Professor
Moore sets forth this example: ". . . assume that A and B had become involved at
various times in a series of unrelated matters that gave rise to the following claims
by A against B: malicious prosecution; slander; negligent injury; deceit and con.
version. All of these claims could be joined in one action, because the first
four were claims in case, and the last a claim in trover. This joinder is not to
be criticized, because . .. these claims can be pleaded in one complaint as well
as in five. But it can be seen that a system which permits this type of joinder
and denies the joinder of trespass and case ... although they were often only
different stories of the same claim-was not based on any rational foundation."
3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1804.
The West Virginia statute has made possible a joinder of trespass and case
as well as other forms which could not be joined at common law, but the basic
inconsistency will continue to exist as long as limitations are placed on the forms
of action that may be joined.
205 The party-joinder rules at common law, discussed above in- the text,
clearly were not based on such considerations. The West Virginia statutes have
not adopted this goal, although the changes as to certain contract defendants
may be used to advantage where common questions of law or fact are present.
See text at page 151 supra.
..2 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTIc E 1804. The following is a conclusion based on
Virginia and West Virginia cases: "Courts of equity have declined to announce a
general rule applicable to all cases of multifariousness, being guided by consid-
erations of convenience in each particular case rather than by tny absolute
rule." 1 HOGG, EQUIrY PROCEDURE §156 (3d ed. Miller, 1943). To the same effect,
see STORY, EQUITY PLEDINGS §580 (10th ed. 1892). The position is not taken here
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in a more liberal concept of a cause of action, being broad enough
in most cases to cover all of the operative facts involved in a trans-
action.227 In addition, the community of interest which is found
to exist between the parties in equity often amounts to no more
than a common question of law or fact being involved and a
multiplicity of suits would otherwise result.228
There are two West Virginia cases which well illustrate this
difference between joinder of causes of action and parties in equity
and at law. In Farley v. Crystal Coal &c Coke Co , 229 one plaintiff
sought damages for injury to his land caused by the action of six
different coal mining corporations which polluted and partly filled
a river flowing through the plaintiff's land. The mines of these
different companies were located at different places on the tribu-
taries of the river, and there was no allegation that the defendants
acted in concert or pursuant to a common design. The court held
that the objection of multifariousness has not unnecessarily at times prevented
the joinder of equitable causes of action in which common questions of law or
fact might have been expediently determined in one suit. Examples may readi-
ly be found in STORY, EQUITY PLEADINGS §§272-286b. Therein may also be found
many illustrations that this occurred much less often in equity than at law. One
basic difference to exemplify this fact is the rule in equity that it is not indis-
pensible that all the parties shall have an interest in all the matters contained in
the suit, it being sufficient if each party has an interest in some matters in the
suit and they are connected with the others. Id. at §271a; KEIoWIN, CAsES IN
CODE PLEADING 439 (1926).
227 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTIcE 1805. By this liberal approach in determining
what is "a cause of action", the equity courts avoid to a large extent the com-
plexities with which the law courts are confronted as to joinder of causes. It
becomes especially important to adopt the equity approach if legal and equitable
remedies are combined under a system of code pleading. Id. at §2.06; CLARu
CODE PLEADING §19. Advantages to be gained from a combined procedure will be
discussed in a folthcoming issue of this Review.
228 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1805, citing STORY, EQUITY PLEADINGS §§284,
530. Many illustrations of the truth of this statement may be found in I POM-
EROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§255-261t. These sections deal with those cases in
which equity entertains jurisdiction of suits by a number of persons having sep-
arate and distinct interests against one person or, the converse, suits by one per-
son against a number of persons each of whom has a separate and distinct claim
in opposition to the general right asserted against all. Typical of the reasons
given for exercising jurisdiction in such cases is this statement quoted therein
from a federal case: "They have thus a community of interest in the questions of
law and fact upon which the issue between the railroad company and each
plaintiff depends ... The fact that the several tracts of land here in dispute were
entered at different dates, and by different persons, is of no consequence, as the
validity of each entry, as against the railroad company, depends upon precisely
the same questions of law and fact. Id. at §261a. By way of contrast compare
State ex rel. Shenandoah Valley National Bank v. Hiett, 123 W. Va. 739, 17 S.
E.2d 878 (1941), decided on the law side with the equity suit in Hibner v.
Ebersbach, 110 W. Va. 177, 157 S. E. 178 (1931). See also Lilly v. Bowling, 120
W. Va. 169, 197 S. E. 299 (1938).
20R 85 W. Va. 595, 102 S. E. 265 (1920).
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that there was no joint liability because the injury resulted in-
directly from the independent action of each, nor could any one of
them be held liable for the entire damage.230 Therefore, the declara-
tion was held defective because of the misjoinder of parties de-
fendant. Neither the absence of direct injury from the defendants'
acts nor the absence of joint action absolved them from liability;
but it did prevent the plaintiff from joining them in the same
action even if his recovery were limited to recovering from each
the damages caused by its acts. This result follows irrespective of
whether inconvenience at the trial is likely to result.
In contrast with this case stands a case on the equity side of
the court. In McMechen v. Hitchman-Glendale Consolidated Coal
Co.,231 the facts were almost identical with those in the Farley
case. Several plaintiffs sought to enjoin several defendants from
doing acts by which a stream of water had been obstructed and
turned out of its course and thus damaged lands of the plaintiffs
in which they had no joint interest. It was not shown that the
deposits were made at the same place by the defendants. The
defendants did not seriously deny liability, but they invoked the
doctrine of multifariousness because of their joinder as defendants.
The court was not impressed by this contention since their acts
were treated in effect as one "cause of action".z32 The court
expressed it this way:
230 In reaching this conclusion, the court expressly overruled Day v. Louis-
ville Coal & Coke Co., 60 W. Va. 27, 53 S. E. 776 (1906), and distinguished John-
son v. Chapman, 43 W. Va. 639, 28 S. E. 744 (1897), which had held that the sep-
arate owners of separate buildings were joint tortfeasors when the buildings had
fallen upon a third building because of the owners' neglect to keep the walls in
repair. The latter case was distinguished on the basis that the injury there was
"the direct and immediate result of the wrongful act." The resurrection of the
distinction between trespass and trespass on the case, trespass being proper if
the injury is immediate. SHIPMAN, COiMION LAW PLEADING 70. Fortunately, the
trespass versus case analogy was not applied in a later case which holds that a
master and servant may be joined as joint tortfeasors when another is injured by
the negligent act of the servant. Lee v. Standard Oil Co., 105 W. Va. 579, 144
S. E. 292 (1928); accord, Wills v. Montfair Gas Coal Co., 97 W. Va. 476, 125 S. E.
367 (1924). The master was not liable in trespass for injuries caused by the
negligence of his servant, whereas the servant who forcibly struck another
through negligence was liable in trespass, although the rule was relaxed by most
courts to permit an election of trespass or case. SHIPMAN, supra at §36. In neith-
er of these cases did the court mention the Farley case, but the Johnson case was
cited in the Wills case for the proposition that both parties guilty of concurrent
negligent acts may be joined even though they had no common purpose and
there was no concert of action.
231 88 W. Va. 633, 107 S. E. 480 (1921).
22 See note 227 supra. The difference between suing at law and in equity
was tersely stated by the Maine court as to similar facts. "The acts of the re-
spondents may be independent and several, but the result of these several acts
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".... Limited in its functions to a mere matter of compen-
sation for damages, a court of law could not, under all circum-
stances, treat it as an entirety, but a court of equity can do so,
because of its more extensive remedial powers.
"Without further discussion of the matter, it suffices to
say the authorities uniformly recognize and uphold jurisdiction
in courts of equity to enjoin, in one suit, all who participate
in the diversion of the waters of a stream, or pollution thereof,
in violation of the legal rights of a riparian owner, whether
they do it by joint or separate acts. . . .The same rule ...
extends to parties plaintiff as well as parties defendant."2 3
Having come to this conclusion on the joinder of the defendants,
the court went further to hold that equity, having taken jurisdic-
tion to abate the nuisance, could in the same suit assess and decree
the resulting damages even though the defendants were not jointly
liable. It was therefore immaterial whether the deposits were made
at the same'place by the defendants for it was not necessary to show
joint liability.
If the damages for which each of the defendants is liable can
be ascertained in one suit in equity, why can this not be done in
one action at law? Of course, the parties are entitled to trial by jury
on the law side, and this might make severance of issues for trial
necessary if the right to trial by jury is not waived; but even
severance would not be necessary if the issues are not likely to be
confusing to the jury. However, if trial by jury is waived, which
often will happen where the issues are likely to be confusing to a
jury, wherein lies the difference whether the proceeding be one at
law or one in equity? Further, many cases may be settled before
trial, and the problems of possible prejudice or confusion at the
trial stage may never be encountered.
A series of cases involving actions against the insured and the
insurer who had issued the insured a liability insurance policy
presents an interesting treatment of the joinder problem both as to
parties and causes of action. In O'Neal v. Pocahontas Transporta-
tion Co.,-34 the plaintiff filed a declaration consisting of two counts,
the first of which contained the common counts in assumpsit and
combines to produce whatever damage or injury these complainants suffer, and
in equity constitutes but one cause of action. It is otherwise in law where dam-
ages are sought to be recovered. There, only those parties can be joined who
have acted jointly in the commission of the act." Lockwood Co. v. Lawrence,
77 Me. 297, 306 (1885), quoted in part with approval in the leading case of War-
ren v. Parkhurst, 186 N. Y. 45, 49, 78 N. E. 579, 580 (1906).
233 88 W. Va. 633, 638, 107 S. E. 480, 482 (1921).
2 4 99 W. Va. 456, 129 S. E. 478 (1925).
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the second asserted that one defendant had qualified as a common
carrier of passengers for hire and that the other defendant, who
had executed the idemnity insurance policy, had impliedly con-
tracted with the plaintiff for safe carriage when she became a
passenger on a bus operated by the other defendant. The de-
fendants objected on the basis of misjoinder of parties defendant
and of "counts" or causes of action. On the second contention, the
court held that the second count sounded in tort, the name by
which it was called not being important, since it claimed damages
peculiarly arising out of tort and therefore the declaration was bad
for a misjoinder with a count sounding in contract. The court
also held that there was a misjoinder of parties defendant since
it was not shown that the defendant insurance company was
primarily liable to the plaintiff either under the insurance contract
or the statute by virtue of which the policy had been obtained.
Both propositions were reconsidered and affirmed in Shepherd v.
Pocahontas Transportation Co.,2 3  wherein the court resolved the
doubt concerning the special count by holding it to sound in tort
and therefore that the counts were improperly joined.
The question of joinder in this type of case next arose in
Conwell v. Hays. . 0 Counsel for the plaintiff conceded that under
the O'Neal case there was no direct liability on the defendant by
virtue of the general provisions of the policy or the statutory pro-
visions under which it had been executed. However, a rider on the
policy provided that the promises of the policy should inure to
the benefit of any person sustaining the injury or damage provided
for in the policy. The court held that this provision permitted the
injured party to maintain an action directly against the insurance
company and that the insured and insurer might be joined in one
action. Nevertheless, a demurrer to the declaration was sustained
because of a misjoinder of causes of action since the liability of the
insured was predicated on a tort whereas the liability of the insurer
was based on a contract.
Several years later a case arose in which the policy contained
the direct public liability clause involved in the Conwell case. 237
The plaintiff joined the insured and the insurer in an action of
assumpsit to recover damages for personal injuries which she
suffered from the alleged negligent operation of the vehicle covered
233 100 W. Va. 703, 131 S. E. 548 (1926).
230 103 W. Va. 69, 136 S. E. 604 (1927).
237 Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S. E. 538 (1932).
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by the insurance policy. With no discussion of whether the declara-
tion was truly in assumpsit, no consideration being given to those
features which had been treated as important in the Shepherd
case,2 -38 the court decided that the action might be maintained in
assumpsit on the "alleged breach of contract" of the insured to keep
the vehicle in good repair. Accordingly, the insurer was properly
joined as a defendant because of its consent thereto in the public
liability clause, as construed in the Conwell case. Although the
court did not discuss the joinder of these forms of action, the
joinder was obviously proper because both sounded in contract and
were asserted in assumpsit. The approach used by the court in this
case was also followed in Cramblitt v. Standard Accident Insur-
ance Co.,2 39 to permit the joinder of the insurer and the insured
in an action of assumpsit to recover damages sustained when the
vehicle in which the plaintiff was a passenger was wrecked.
Even assuming that the plaintiff may be able to obtain a
greater amount of damages in some cases if he causes his action
to sound in tort, and assuming further that there is some justifica-
tion for requiring his action to "sound in tort" in order to obtain
these additional damages, wherein lies the justification for not
permitting him to bring an action sounding in tort against the
person causing the injury and join the other party who has agreed
to pay him those damages? If he is not permitted to do so, he may
be required to bring two actions before he can obtain a judgment
against the insurer. Our court has held that even the direct public
liability clause does not permit the injured person to proceed
against the insurer alone until his claim is liquidated, either by
a final judgment against the insured or by an agreement to which
the insurer is a party 40 Joinder of the causes of action is per-
missible if the plaintiff is able to recover all of his damages in an
action in assumpsit and is able to allege his cause so that it is held
to be in fact in assumpsit, but two actions are necessary if his entire
038 In the Shepherd case the court had emphasized the general principles
on which a count should be construed to be one in tort rather than in contract
iF there be any doubt as to which it is, and had pointed out that neither the
nature of the action stated in the writ or declaration nor the allegation of the
contract of transportation is necessarily controlling in this determination.
239 116 W. Va. 359, 180 S. E. 434 (1935).
"40 Criss v. United States Fidelity & G. Co., 105 W. Va. 380, 142 S. E. 849
(1928). If the injured party has recovered a judgment against the tortfeasor,
he may maintain an action at law against the insurer. Smith v. United States
Fidelity & G. Co., 109 W. Va. 280, 153 S. E. 584 (1930). For criticism of this case
as to permitting an action at law rather than in equity, see Donley, The Sole
Beneficiary Problem in West Virginia, 49 W. VA. L. Q. 132, 137 (1943).
52
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 3 [1950], Art. 2
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol52/iss3/2
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
damages can be recovered only in trespass on the case or if the
court holds that the cause as stated against the tortfeasor sounds
in tort. Clearly the difference in procedure in these two cases does
not arise from considerations of trial convenience or from fear of
prejudice to the insurer. The difference can be explained only
on the basis of the arbitrary rules of common law concerning
joinder of tort and contract claims. No attempt is made by the
court to justify the difference on any other basis241
That the statutory changes permitting joinder of additional
forms of action have been helpful in speeding litigation but that
the existing rules have no consistency of purpose because of the
limitations as to joinder of parties, is well illustrated in Beuke v.
Boggs Run Mining & Mfg. Co.242 Plaintiff was the owner of a
.672-acre tract of coal land and was also the owner of the surface
of a contiguous tract of 18.5 acres. Both of these tracts had been
purchased from the defendant mining company which had later
leased the coal underlying the latter tract to Ramsay, who had
assigned his rights to Cotts, the other defendant. Cotts proceeded
to take out the coal. The plaintiff alleged violation of his rights
and set out his damages in a declaration in trespass on the case in
three separate subdivisions. He alleged, first, that coal was mined
underlying his .672-acre tract without his consent and without
leaving any support for the overlying strata, second, that there was
a failure to protect the mining under the 18.5-acres tract so that
the surface would not fall in, and third, that, without the consent
of the plaintiff, there were four invasions within five feet of the
line dividing the coal between the two tracts and asked for the
statutory penalty for each violation. 43 Both defendants demurred
to the declaration. The demurrer was sustained as to the mining
company but overruled as to Cotts. Since the statutory penalty
may be recovered either in an action of debt Z 4" or trespass on the
case, 2 the plaintiff could use the latter form of action and join
other causes in that form whether originally proper in trespass or
241 Professor Sunderland's comment on the sacredness of ancient authority
on the joinder problem seems appropriate. "Chitty, the greatest expounder
of the common law system of pleading, reverently followed by generations ofjudges as the 'word' behind which it was vanity to attempt to look." Sunderland,
Joinder of Actions, 18 MICH. L. REv. 571, 573 (1920).
142 00 W. Va. 141, 130 S. E. 132 (1925).
243 The statute is quoted in part in note 122 supra.
244 Sims v. Alderson, 35 Va. (8 Leigh) 479 (1836); see West v. Rawson, 40
W. Va. 480, 482, 21 S. E. 1019 (1895).
z45 Mapel v. John, 42 W. Va. 30, 24 S. E. 608 (1896).
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case? 46 Accordingly, the causes of action were properly joined
against Cotts. However, liability asserted against the mining com-
pany for the acts set forth in the declaration was based on its being
the lessor of the other defendant who committed the acts. Part of
the acts complained of pertained to the .672-acre tract which the
lease did not cover. The mining company was therefore dismissed
from the action because causes of action may not be joined against
several defendants unless they "affect all of the'defendants." Why
should the mining company not have been left in the action as to
damages to the larger tract of land? If any confusion was likely to
result from the issues concerning the smaller tract, the court
should be permitted to separate those issues for trial; but if con-
fusion was unlikely, the complete liability from the same transac-
tion involving largely the same evidence might have been settled
in one action.
G. Consequences of Nonjoinder and Misjoinder of Parties
and Causes of Action Since 1931247
Although no great liberalization in the common law rules as
to joinder of parties, plaintiff or defendant, has been made in
West Virginia procedure, the consequences of misjoinder or non-
joinder of parties have been greatly altered.2 48 Generally, a failure
to comply with the rules is no more serious in its consequences
than it would be under the new Federal Rules.2 4 9 Federal Rule 21
provides that misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of
an action and that parties may be dropped or added by order of
the court on motion of any party or of its own initiative at any
stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Noticeably absent
from the West Virginia statute is the provision that any claim
against a party may be severed and proceeded with separately. 25 0
240 See text at page 170 supra.
047 Some of the changes to be discussed herein have already been called to
the attention of the bar. Carlin, Parties to Actions and Suits under the Revised
Code, 43 W. Va. L. Q. 87, 105 (1937).
4 8 The common law rules on party joinder and the consequences of
violating those rules have been discussed. See the text at pages 142-150 supra
and the notes thereto. Modifications in the common law rules as to joinder
have been mentioned and criticized. See the text at pages 151-167 supra. The
consequences of failure to comply with the existing rules remain to be noted.
249 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective September 16,
1938. They are set forth in 28 U. S. C. A. following §723c (1941).
250 The last sentence in Federal Rule 21 so reads. Although misjoinder
of actions seldom will be present under the liberal rules us to joinder of parties
and actions (see discussion in text at pages 199, 204 infra), this rule permits the
court to sever "the misjoined claim" for trial and removes the necessity of
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It will be noted that an additional action for such claims would
be required in West Virginia.
Two sections of the West Virginia Code, as revised, have re-
moved the necessity of starting a new action merely because of
misjoinder or nonjoinder of parties. One section provides that
no action or suit shall abate or be defeated by the misjoinder or
nonjoinder of parties, plaintiff or defendant, and that misjoined
parties may be dropped at any stage of the cause or nonjoined
parties may be added at any stage of the cause before final judgment
or decree..2 rl The other section, designed to operate irrespective
of elimination of parties, adopts for contract defendants the com-
mon law rule as to tort defendants.2 5, It provides that in actions or
motions, founded on contract, against two or more defendants, the
fact that one or more of the defendants is found not liable on the
contract shall not prevent the plaintiff from having judgment
against any other defendant or defendants who are liable. This
section applies at any stage of the cause.
2
5
3
A statute similar to this latter section had been in the law
before,2 54 but as noted above the court had so construed it that
judgments against contract defendants had to be taken, if taken
at all, against all contract defendants except where some of the
defendants had personal defenses. 2  The revisers eliminated the
possibility of this narrow construction by providing expressly that
the rule now to be applied is the same as if the action were against
tort defendants.25 6
Concerning the statute which provides that misjoinder or
nonjoinder of parties shall not cause the action to abate or be
starting a new action when the latter procedure would produce hardship.
CLARK, CODE PLEADING 368, 392; 3 MooiaE, FEDERAL PRAcTICE §18.05. Professor
Moore cites two instances in which severance might well be used: when the
statute of limitations would bar new actions and when it would be difficult
or expensive to re-serve the defendants with process. Ibid. Compare the West
Virginia statute paraphrased in the text.
M31 W. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 4, §34 (Michie, 1949).
052 Pence v. Bryant, 73 W. Va. 126, 80 S. E. 137 (1913) (misjoinder of tort
defendants does not prevent judgment against those properly sued).
153 W. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 6, §32 (Michie, 1949).
254 W. VA. CODE C. 131, §19 (Barnes, 1923).
2.-i See the text at pages 147-149 supra.
156 "... the fact that one or more of the defendants, at any stage of the
cause or for any reason, is found not liable on the contract shall not prevent
the plaintiff from having, as if the motion or action were an action founded
on tort, verdict and judgment, or judgment alone, as the case may be, against
any other defendant or defendants who are liable." Italics supplied. IV. VA.
CODE c. 56, art. 6, §32 (Michie, 1949).
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defeated, 2 7 commentators have expressed the opinion that this
eliminated the possibility of using a demurrer or a plea in abate-
ment for nonjoinder or misjoinder of parties.2 5 The court, however,
has taken the position that the defect may ' 9 and should20 be raised
by demurrer, basing its decision on the revised section of the code
which provides that the sufficiency of any pleading may be tested
by a demurrer.2 1 The commentators base their conclusion on the
theory that the function of a demurrer is to defeat the action where
a defect goes to the operative effect of the pleading and that the
function of a plea in abatement is to abate the action. 02 Technically
these are the proper functions of a demurrer and a plea in abate-
ment, and the phraseology of the statute does not permit either
result to occur. However, by statute a demurrer must state
specifically the grounds relied on,2 3 and the statute concerning
misjoinder and nonjoinder of parties contains an additional pro-
vision that a correction of parties shall be made whenever the
nonjoinder or misjoinder appears "by affidavit or otherwise",20 4
an affidavit being required only as to the residence of a nonjoined
party before he may be added as a new party.20, Relying upon this
part of the statute, a "demurrer" in proper form seems to be one
way to call the court's attention to the defect, although this reason-
ing does not support the court's position that a demurrer should be
used. Any other means of pointing out the defect ought to be
sufficient even though an affidavit may be required before a new
party is added.260
257 See note 251 supra.
258 Carlin, supra note 247, at 107; Lynch, Pleading and Practice under
the Revised Code, 37 W. VA. L. Q. 60, 68 (1930); 44 W. VA. L. Q. 228, 229 (1938).
259 Mainella v. Board of Trustees of Policemen's etc., 126 W. Va. 183,
27 S. E.2d 486 (1943).
280 Lawhead v. Doddridge County Bank, 119 W. Va. 467, 194 S. E. 79 (1937).
261 Id. at 471, 194 S. E. at 81.
262 See note 258 supra, especially Carlin, supra note 247, at 107.
263 W. VA. CODE C. 56, art. 4, §36 (Michie, 1949).
204 "Whenever such misjoinder shall be made to appear by affidavit or
otherwise .... and such nonjoinder shall be made to appear by affidavit or
otherwise .. " W. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 4, §34 (Michie, 1949).
203 See note 266 infra.
266 Professor Carlin states that the proper method would be to make a
motion to eliminate or add parties, with the presentation of an affidavit showing
the misjoinder or the nonjoinder and the required facts as to a nonjoined
person's residence. He suggests that a plea in abatement might be used as a
substitute for the motion and affidavit since such plea should embody all the
facts required to go into the affidavit and must be under oath. Carlin, supra
note 247, at 107. The statute does expressly require an affidavit as to the
residence of a nonjoined person before he may be added as a party, but there
is no provision therein requiring an affidavit for any purpose as to misjoined
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The important consideration is that the proper parties be
present to protect their interests and that those not interesed be
dismissed, and that the action be not defeated or abated by the
nonjoinder or misjoinder, regardless of the way in which it is made
to appear to the court. In a recent declaratory judgment proceed-
ing the plaintiff failed to join two necessary parties defendant.
The question was raised by a demurrer, and the court in effect
sustained the demurrer but remanded the cause with directions
that the two omitted persons be made parties before the case
proceeded further.2 "67 The court cited in support of this direction
the statute providing that the action should not be defeated by a
nonjoinder of parties. This indicates that the old rule which
generally prevented an amendment where nonjoinder or misjoinder
of parties was made to appear 2 68 has been abolished, regardless of
the method used to raise the objection. What the court may do if
the demurrer is sustained and no amendment is made is not dear.
Although the statute indicates the action is not be to defeated,
dismissal from failure to prosecute may follow. 2 9
Two other problems may arise under this statute. First, may
this statute be used to correct an error where the wrong person
sues or is sued, either by joining the proper party with the wrong
one or by joining him and then asking that the other be dropped,
in effect, substituting the proper party? Although the section does
permit amendments which were deemed changes in the cause
of action at common law,270 it does not permit the "substitution
of a different cause of action." In Crook v. Ferguson,27 1 the wrong
person was named as plaintiff. A rental agent for a disclosed princi-
pal sought to maintain an action of unlawful entry and detainer
against the lessee. The court held that the error was fatal to the
persons. Even as to nonjoined persons there would appear to be no reason
that this defect might not be shown by a demurrer and the party questioning
the nonjoinder be required to furnish the affidavit after the court had decided
whether there was a nonjoinder as to parties. In effect this is what the court
did in Mainella v. Board of Trustees of Policemen's etc., 126 W. Va. 183, 27
S. E.2d 486 (1943).
2(7 Mainella v. Board of Trusteees of Policemen's etc., supra note 266;
accord, Mullens v. Davidson, 57 S. E.2d 1 (W. Via. 1949) (misjoinder of party
plaintiff).
208 Carlin, supra note 247, at 106.
Z09 W. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 4, §6 (Michie, 1949) provides: "If the plaintiff
shall, at any time after the defendant's appearance, fail to prosecute his
suit, he shall be nonsuited."
z70 See note 268 supra. Limitations on the right to amend will be discussed
in a forthcoming issue of this Review.
27, 123 W. Va. 490, 16 S. E.2d 620 (1941).
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action, not being curable either by joining the principal as co-
plaintiff or by substituting her as sole plaintiff. Under this section
the general rule, as stated by the court, is that there can be no
amendment as to parties which will result in a complete change
of plaintiffs or defendants.27 - In effect the decision treats an action
brought by a person having no interest in the subject matter as a
nullity.
The other problem which may arise under the statute is
whether it alters the equity rule that a decree on the merits will
not be rendered unless all of the persons jointly interested in the
subject matter are parties to the action. Will the suit abate for
the nonjoinder of an indispensable party? Although the West
Virginia court has not passed directly upon this point, the one
case27 3 in which the court found that "necessary parties" had not
been joined as defendants was remanded with directions that they
be made parties before the case proceeded further. This was a pro-
ceeding for a declaratory judgment, but the relief sought was in
part equitable in nature..2 74 The federal rule has not been held to
excuse the joinder of indispensable parties, and the action will be
dismissed where they are not joined.7-2
r27 The courts are not in agreement as to whether Federal Rule 21 permits
the substitution of parties, plaintiff or defendant. 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcricE
2907. Professor Moore terms a failure to permit such substitution an "unduly
narrow restriction" of the rule, pointing out that this is especially true since
the same result can be attained by a liberal interpretation of the rule on amend-
ments. Id. at §15.08. The amendment rules will be discussed in a forthcoming
issue of this Review. Note here however, Kingman Mills v. Furner, 89 W. Va.
511, 109 S. E. 600, 28 W. VA. L. Q. 241 (1921), which permitted what the dissent
termed "a substitution of an artificial person for no person at all." Under
the statute, which is now W. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 4, §29 (Michie, 1949), allowing
an amendment to correct a misnomer, the plaintiff was permitted to substitute
"The Kansas Flour Mills Company, a corporate body, trading as The Kingman
Mills" for "Kingman Mills, a branch of the Kansas Flour Mills Company".
173 Mainella v. Board of Trustees of Policemen's etc., 126 W. Va. 183, 27
S. E.2d 486 (1943).
274 "The general theory as to who are indispensable and necessary parties
applies to suits for declaratory judgments. Obviously, an indispensable party
must be joined in a declaratory judgment action, just as in any other, since the
court could not proceed to enter an equitable judgment in the absence of such
a party." 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTCE 2197.
27-- Greenberg v. Giannini, 140 F.2d 550, 152 A. L. R. 966 (2d Cir. 1944);
United States v. Washington Institute of Technology, 138 F.2d 25 (3d Cir. 1943).
This construction is aided by Federal Rule 19 which expressly indicates that
the rule as to indispensable parties is not changed. Professor Carlin concludes
that the West Virginia statute does not change the rule as to such parties,
that a decree will not be entered unless they are parties, and that the suit will
be dismissed if they are not made parties. Carlin, supra note 247, at 107. See
also discussion in text at page 193 supra.
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The former law had permitted nonjoinder of persons against
whom an action was barred by the statute of frauds or the statute
of limitations. If these defenses were available to the nonjoined
defendants, the defendant who raised the issue on a plea in abate-
ment had the issue found against him.2 7 6 The revisers omitted those
provisions of the earlier law since the defenses were personal and
might not be raised by the omitted persons if they were joined.2 7 7
The importance of this change has been lessened by the statutory
broadening of the cases in which the plaintiff may at his option
omit persons jointly liable, a revision already criticized herein,278
but the change is important where the plaintiff is not given the
option. To the extent that the elimination of this preliminary
issue is applicable, it permits a complete determination of liability
in one proceeding and is not subject to the criticism directed to the
section which permits the plaintiff to proceed severally against
persons jointly liable without any excuse for the nonjoinder.
None of these statutes eliminates the necessity of two actions
where there is a misjoinder of causes of actions which misjoinder
may be involved where parties are improperly joined.2 7 9 Where
causes are misjoined the action may even be defeated unless
amendments are made in the pleadings to drop one group of the
misjoined counts.280 The federal rule as to parties does not purport
to be different in its effect,2 8 ' but other rules under that system
have liberalized what causes may be joined.' 2
Before completing a discussion of the effect of misjoinder of
parties, one other statutory change made by the revisers should
be mentioned. Bills in equity which are multifarious often involve
a misjoinder of parties. Prior to the revision of the code such
misjoinder of parties could not be cured by an amendment because
of the technical rule that a multifarious bill could not be amended
to cure a misjoinder of causes of action.' 83 This rule had not been
276 W. VA. CODE c. 125, §18 (Barnes, 1923).
277 Revisers' note to W. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 4, §34 (Michie, 1949).
278 See the text at pages 151-155 supra.
279 In a recent case the West Virginia court held that the lower court had
properly sustained a demurrer to a declaration which alleged liability against
three defendants since there was a misjoinder of rights of action, "resulting in
a like misjoinder of parties defendant." State ex rel. Alderson v. Holbert, 56
S. E.2d 114 (W. Va. 1949). See also text at pages 180-182 supra.
z8o See notes 193, 221 supra.
281 Ginsberg v. Standard Oil Co. of N. J., 5 F. R. D. 48 (1945).
282 See the text at pages 199, 204 supra.
283 County Court of Harrison County v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 80 W. Va.
286, 92 S. E. 726 (1917); Cecil v. Karnes, 61 W. Va. 543, 56 S. E. 885 (1907).
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followed in West Virginia even on the law siden 4 and the revisers
expressly abolished it.2"'
Although these statutes have gone far in modifying the con.
sequences of misjoinder or nonjoinder of parties at common law,
the changes did not go far enough. Only slight modifications were
made in other sections to permit joinder of parties where it was
not permitted before, and no necessity exists for the present
limitations on joind~r of causes which may prevent joinder of
counts which could be used to avoid additional actions. The
emphasis has not been on deciding what matters can conveniently
be tried by the court in one action without any prejudice resulting
to either party.
H. Joinder of Parties under Code Pleading
and the Federal Rules
As previously shown, the rules as to joinder of parties in law
actions in West Virginia continue to be based largely on the
common law.zs6 Little consideration has been given to the objective
found in equity rules of joinder, namely, to settle an entire trans-
action in one proceeding if it can be done conveniently and without
prejudice to the parties. -17 The saving of time and expense involved
in many unnecessary actions has not been the goal generally. The
only analogy to equity practice is the revision as to consequences
where there has been a misjoinder or nonjoinder of parties.n8
(1) Code Pleading.2 8 9 The rules of equity joinder were used
as the basis of joinder of parties in the earlier codes.2'0 Persons
united in interest were required to be joined as plaintiffs or
defendants, subject to the exceptions formerly allowed by equity
284 Cases cited in note 221 supra.
285 "... . the court ... may ... permit any pleading to be amended ...
eliminating from a multifarious bill all but one of the equitable causes of action
alleged." W. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 4, §24 (Michie, 1949). See also the revisers'
note to this section. The rules on amendments will be discussed in a forthcoming
issue of this Review.
286 See the text at pages 151-167 supra.
287 CLARK, CODE PLEADING 353. See also note 228 supra.
88 See Vinson v. Home Insurance Co., 123 W. Va. 522, 526, 16 S. E.2d 924,
926 (1941); Carlin, supra note 247, at 107.
289 In referring to the provisions of the earlier codes and the decisions
thereunder, the past tense will be used herein to accentuate the contrast between
results under those codes and what may be accomplished under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and codes containing provisions similar to those rules.
By using the past tense the writer does not intend to imply that many code
jurisdictions are not at the present time burdened with the unduly restrictive
rules herein discussed.
200 For a detailed discussion of the adoption of the equitable principles
as to parties in the early codes, see KEI wIN, CASES IN CODE PLEADING §§38, 39,
41, 42 (1926); PHILLIPS, CODE PLEADING §§250-259.
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courts.291 All persons having an interest in the subject of the action
and in obtaining the relief demanded might be joined as plain-
tiffs,2' 2 and any person might be made a defendant who had or
claimed an interest in the controversy adverse to the plaintiff or
who was a necessary party to the complete determination or settle-
ment of the question therein.2 3 Because of the interpretation which
was placed on these provisions for permissive joinder by many
courts, the liberality permitted in equity courts was not allowed.294
As to plaintiffs in actions formerly triable at law, it was often
held that they must have an interest both "in the whole subject
of the action and in all the relief demanded,"2 5 and the mutual
interest required in the relief demanded prevented joinder where
the parties were each seeking money damages.28  For example,
contractees, under contracts which were separate but involved
common questions of law or fact, were not permitted to join in
suing the obligor. However, under these provisions owners of
separate interests in the same land were permitted to join to re-
cover damages for an injury to the land caused by one act of the
defendant0 7 However, if the defendant's act injured lands of which
the plaintiffs each owned separate parcels, they were not permitted
to join in an action for damages, even though a joinder would have
been permitted if an injunction had been sought in a comparable
case.' 8 This suggests that the rules of joinder as to plaintiffs under
291 CLARK, CODE PLEADING 359, 381. One of the exceptions stated is that
an unwilling plaintiff may be made a defendant, an exception recognized in
Vinson v. Home Insurance Co., 123 W. Va. 522, 526, 16 S. E.2d 924, 926 (1941).
It may be questioned whether this fact alone is sufficient to give equityjurisdiction. 48 W. VA. L. Q. 184 (1942).
292' CLARK, CODE PLEADING 365.
293 Id. at 382.
294 The restrictive interpretations placed upon these provisions are discussed
in the following paragraphs of the text. Judge Clark believes that the reason
for the departure from the liberal equity rules rested in two defects in language.
He writes: ". . . they are couched in terms of absolute declaration and
restriction, rather than as general directions to guide, but not to bind, the
court in the exercise of discretion. And they contain the troublesome require-
ment of an 'interest in obtaining the relief demanded' in all the plaintiffs."
Id. at 369.
205 Id. at 366. Italics supplied.
298 Some courts realized that this interpretation of the rule required an
unnecessary multiplicity of actions and permitted obligees with separate interests
in the same instrument to join in an action against the obligor, stressing for the
purpose of the rule that lump sum recovery was sought. Ibid. Compare the
West Virginia rule at pages 157-167 supra.
297 Ibid. Compare the West Virginia rule at pages 157-162 supra.
208 CLARK, CODE PLEADING 367. Compare the West Virginia cases discussed
in the text at pages 184-186 supra.
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these provisions were not greatly different from those which prevail
in West Virginia. 09
As to permissive joinder of defendants under the earlier code
provisions, experience thereunder showed that the common law
rules had not been greatly different. In part, this was a result of
the restrictions placed by code provisions on joinder of causes of
action. This problem will be developed presently °00  A few
examples will here suffice. Joinder was permissible if the court
could find that the defendants were joint tortfeasors even though
they had not acted in concert, for example, if the wrongful acts
had been concurrent and had resulted in a single injury to the
plaintiff.""1 If the separate acts which resulted in the injury were
not concurrent and joint liability was not recognized, the de-
fendants generally could not be joined unless the plaintiff sought
relief in equity. 02 This again shows the similarity to West Virginia
law.303 A special code provision, similar to the West Virginia
statute,3 10 4 was generally inserted to permit the plaintiff to join all
or any persons severally liable on the same obligation or instru-
ment.305 Here again, even with the general language liberality of
other provisions of the code, courts were reluctant to permit a
joinder of defendants where their liability arose from separate
documents covering the same transaction300 unless the statute
expressly provided that this was immaterial. " r The West Virginia
court reached the same conclusion.303 Some courts went so far as to
209 To avoid repetition of the West Virginia law as to the points in this
paragraph, there has been included in the note on each point a cross reference
to the pages in the text at which the applicable West Virginia law was discussed.
:0o See text at page 202 infra. Judge Clark believes that another reason
for the restrictive intrepretations placed on the code provision as to joinder
of defendants was the restrictive rules applied to joinder of plaintiffs. Id. at
383, 391.
.ol Ibid. See the West Virginia case discussed in note 27 supra.
10 Id. at 384. The West Virginia cases are discussed in the text at pages
184-186 supra.
303 See notes 299, 301, and 302 supra. There was a split of authority as
to whether master and servant might be joined when within the scope of his
employment the servant by a negligent act had injured the plaintiff. CLARK,
CODE PLEADING 385. The more liberal view that such joinder is permitted
prevails in West Virginia on common law principles. Lee v. Standard Oil Co.,
105 W. Va. 579, 144 S. E. 292 (1928).
304 Discussed in the text at pages 151-155 supra.
305 CLARK, CODE PLEADING 386.
300 Id. at 387. The reason given was that there were "two causes of action"
and that neither affected both defendants. See discussion in text at pages 154-
155 supra.
307 Ibid.
308 Case discussed in the text at pages 154-155 supra.
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hold that the code provision did not permit persons making
separate promises in a single instrument to be joined as defend-
ants." 09 This is the same problem which has faced the West Virginia
court, namely, are these transactions to be treated as creating two
causes of action, neither of which affects both defendants. 310
(2) The Federal Rule. The departures from the equity rules
which exist under the earlier code provisions have been eliminated
by the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the code provi-
sions of states which have patterned their procedure on those
rules. The rules of compulsory joinder of parties is retained, sub-
ject to the exceptions allowed by an equity court; 311 but the
restriction that all parties plaintiff must be interested in the whole
relief demanded before they may be joined has been discarded;3 12
and express language removes the possibility of those restrictive
interpretations which prevented a freer joinder of parties defendant
under the earlier codes.313 The great liberality permitted in joining
causes of action under the new rules, to be discussed presently," 4
removes any danger of a limitation being found in those rules of
joinder which would restrict a joinder of parties.
Federal Rule 20 (a) provides:
"All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they
assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative
in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence
or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of
law or fact common to all of them will arise in the action.
All persons may be joined in one action as defendants if there
is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative,
any right to relief in respect of or arising out of thd same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences
and if any question of law or fact common to all of them will
arise in the action."3' 5
To remove any doubt that the restriction of each party's being
interested in all of the relief demanded has been eliminated, the
rule further provides, "A plaintiff or defendant need not be in-
terested in obtaining or defending against all the relief demanded."
309 Id. at 388.
310 See discussion in the text at pages 154-155 supra.
311 See note 291 supra; Federal Rule 19; CLARK, CODE PLEADING 360; 3
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTIcE §§19.05 [1], 19.19, 19.20.
312 This restriction was discussed in the text at pages 166, 197 supra.
313 These interpretations were discussed in the text at page 198 supra.
"314 See text at page 204 infra.
31G Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, following 28 U. S. C. A. §723c (1941).
Italics supplied.
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And if it becomes necessary, the court may "order separate trials
or make other orders to prevent delay or prejudice."
The advantages in that part of the rule which deals with
joinder of parties in the alternative will be discussed in a forth-
coming issue of this Review. The remainder of the rule makes it
certain that no limitation will be placed in the way of joining
plaintiffs because of some limitation on the joinder of defendants,
or vice versa,3 16 for the same liberality is extended in the joinder
of either. Whether the numerous parties involved be plaintiffs
or defendants, the disputes arising out of any transaction or series
of transactions may be completely settled in one action if the claims
involve common questions of law or fact. This device may be used
to save time and expense involved in trying the same main issues
in many actions because of the restrictive rules of party joinder
which prevail under the earlier codes, at common law, and in
West Virginia. For example, where a number of persons are injured
by an allegedly negligent act of the defendant, these persons may,
but are not required to, join in one action to determine the de-
fendant's liability to them; or a parent and an infant may join as
plaintiffs to enforce their separate claims arising from the allegedly
negligent act of the defendant which injured the child. If it
appears inexpedient to have all of the issues decided in one trial,
the court possesses the power to order separate trials of the issues
to the extent that it is necessary to prevent delay or prejudice. 17
Other examples might be here enumerated, both as to permitted
joinder of plaintiffs or defendants, but this could involve merely
a repetition of the cases already criticized. To avoid that, reference
is merely made to the preceding discussion of the West Virginia
cases on party joinder.318 The adoption of a rule likethe federal
rule would go far in permitting joinder in the cases criticized.
The additional change needed to assure this result is discussed in
the following section.
316 See note 300 supra.
317 In addition to the provision in Rule 20 (a) which permits such severance
of issues for trial, see Rule 42 (b) quoted in note 335 infra.
318 Many additional illustrations may be readily found in the cases cited
in the footnotes to CLARK, CODE PLEADING §§58, 389, and 3 MooRE, FEDERAL
PRACncE §§20.03, 20.05, 20.06. See also the court rule permitting joinder of
claims against insurance companies in West Virginia, discussed in the text at
page 206 infra. In addition, see Professor Moore's summary quoted in the text
at page 205 infra.
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L Joinder of Causes of Action under Code Pleading
and the Federal Rules
Correlative with a liberalization in the rules of party joinder,
to prevent this freedom from being denied by re.trictive rules on
joinder of causes of action,3 1' it is necessary either that a broader
than customary view of a cause of action be adopted or that great
freedom in joining causes of action be permitted. 20 To avoid any
possibility that a narrow view of a cause of action may be applied
to prevent the objective of settling in one action common questions
of law or fact arising from the same transaction involving numerous
parties, the safer course is to adopt the second alternative. This
alternative will, in addition, permit numerous questions between
one party plaintiff and one party defendant to be settled in one
action, which joinder is now denied solely on the basis of improper
joinder of causes.
The West Virginia rules on joinder of causes of action do not
offer any assurance that widely different issues will not be intro-
a1o This danger is evident from those West Virginia cases discussed herein
in which it was held that the demurrer to the declaration should be sustained
because of a misjoinder of both parties and causes of action. In other juris-
dictions where the party joinder rules have been liberalized, it has been
demonstrated that a retained restrictive view of a cause of action will defeat
intended permitted party joinder in the absence of liberalized rules as to joinder
of causes. The case most often cited and criticized as illustrating this point
is Ader v. Blau, 241 N. Y. 7, 148 N. E. 771, 41 A. L. R. 1216 (1925). A New
York statute permitted joinder of defendants in the alternative, an advantage
to be discussed in a forthcoming issue of this Review. An administrator suing
for the death of a child alleged that one defendant had negligently maintained
a fence upon which the child had been fatally injured and that the other
defendant, a doctor, had negligently treated the child for the injuries received
and thus caused the death. Held, that there was a misjoinder of parties and
causes. The rules as to the latter nullified in part the liberalized rules as to the
former. In addition to the extensive law review comments on this case cited in
CLARK, CODE PLEADING 439 n. 16, see 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTiCE 2719.
Vo The West Virginia court's concept of a "cause of action" will be
developed in a forthcoming issue of this Review in relation to the problem
of amendments which do or do not change the cause of action. It may be
noted here that a cause of action at law has not been viewed by this court as
embracing all matters "connected with a transaction that can be handled
together conveniently." Id. at 1803. This latter view would prevent in most
cases a problem of joinder of causes from arising as to the liberalized rules
on party joinder herein recommended since those rules limit joinder of parties
to instances where the disputes between them arose out of the same transaction
and involve at least some question of law or fact common to all of the parties
joined. See text at page 199 supra; CLARK, CODE PLEADING §19; 2 MooRE,
FEDERAL PRAcrcE §2.06[4]. In the absence of the adoption of this concept by
the court, which appears unlikely, the liberalized rules as to joinder of parties
might be nullified in part by the existing rules as to joinder of causes which
have been discussed herein. See text at pages 183-190 supra.
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duced into a case, 321 but they may prevent joinder of all the claims
that arose out of one transaction and involve common questions of
law or fact.
3 22.
(1) Code Pleading2 The earlier rules in code pleading as to
joinder of causes were usually a combination of the equity and
common law rules.2 Joinder of causes was permitted if the claims
were all within certain specified classes. Judge Clark summarizes
those classes as follows:
"... The number of classes differs in the various states,
ranging from six in Kentucky to ten in Nevada and Ohio. The
usual classes include the following in some combination: (1)
contracts, express or implied; (2) injuries to the person; (3)
injuries to the character; (4) injuries to property; (5) actions
to recover real property with or without damages; (6) actions
to recover chattels with or without damages; (7) claims against
a trustee by virtue of a contract or operation of law; (8) actions
arising out of the same transaction or transactions connected
with the same subject of action. Often certain of the tort classes
are found combined, and in some codes the last class is
omitted." 325
Legal claims within these classes do not correspond with those
which may be joined at common law or in West Virginia, some
classes being less restrictive but others being more restrictive.3 2 0
They are all broader than the West Virginia classes to the extent
that claims whether formerly legal or equitable may be joined
within classes -32 7 but this results from a merger of legal and equi-
table remedies which will be discussed in a forthcoming issue of
this Review.
The joinder of legal claims within these code classes is subject
to the same criticism which has been directed to the West Virginia
.-21 See this criticism illustrated in the text at pages 169-180 supra.
. 2 See the cases discussed in the text at pages 183-190 supra.
323 The use of the past tense in discussing this topic is subject to the
explanation set forth in note 289 supra.
324 CLARK, CODE PLEADING 437.
225 Id. at 441.
226 The common law and West Virginia rules have been discussed in the
text at pages 167-175 supra, and nothing of great value would be learned from
a detailed enumeration of the instances in which the code rules were more
or less restrictive than the existing rules in West Virginia since, as Professor
Moore states, the code rules amounted to nothing more than "a reshuffling
of the common law rules." 3 MooRE, rEDERAL PRACTCE 1805. See notes 328-330
infra. It may be noted generally that a greater similarity of claims may be
found within the groups joinable under the codes than may be found within
the groups joinable under West Virginia practice.
327 The usual provision is that such claims may be joined if they fall
within one of the specified classes. CLARu, CODE PLEADING 444.
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rules. They permit some unrelated claims to be joined in one
action 328 but require other unrelated claims to be asserted in
separate actions,3 2 9 while not permitting joinder of claims which
are related unless they happen to fall within one of the arbitrary
classes specified.3 30 As Judge Clark states, some of these harsher
results might have been avoided by a liberal interpretation of the
terms used in the eighth class above.33' However, many courts
restricted joinder thereunder to cases where the claims asserted
were not "legally distinct", and ignored the equity idea of joinder
which was the basis embodied in that class. 33 2 To remedy such
undesirable restrictions many states, including non-code jurisdic-
tions, have been removing restrictions on joinder of causes.3 3 3 The
liberalization has taken various forms. Some states have removed
all restrictions except that legal and equitable causes may not be
united, while others have retained some additional restrictions,
such as not permitting joinder of causes in replevin and ejectment
actions. The more recently modified rules have followed sub-
stantially the liberal treatment in the Federal Rules.
328 For example, claims for damages based on a number of contracts may be
joined even though there is no relationship between the contracts.
320 For example, unrelated tort claims may fall into different classes.
Greater liberality in joining such claims is permitted in West Virginia, both
because of the variety of claims assertable in one form of action at common
law and because of the statute which now permits in effect joinder of claims
assertable at common law in trespass, trespass on the case, and trover. See
discussion in text pages 173-174 supra. In addition, as in West Virginia, dif-
ferent theories of the same wrong are not joinable if the claim is stated in such
a way that it falls by allegation into different specified classes. The West Vir-
ginia restriction as to this problem is discussed in the text at pages 175-177 supra.
330 For example, in one transaction the defendant violates a contractual
agreement with the plaintiff and damages or detains unlawfully property
owned by the plaintiff. Allegations of this nature might be asserted merely
as different theories of the case. In either event, the claims may not be joined
since they would fall into different classes under the codes or would be asserted
in forms of action not joinable in West Virginia. Compare note 329 supra.
33' CLARK, CODE PLEADING 442, 452-456.
33Z Id. at §69. Professor Moore tersely states that the real vice in the
statement of class eight was that a narrow concept of a cause of action was
adopted and as a consequence many courts applied the narrow common law
concept of a cause of action. 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAc ic 1805. See note 320
supra. Judge Clark and Professor Moore both use as illustrations of this
interpretation the New York cases which held that there could be no joinder
of claims by A if he were assaulted by B and at the same time B slandered A.
At common law an action of trespass and an action of trespass on the case
would be required and they were not joinable; therefore, the court took the
position that there were different causes of action not arising out of the same
transaction. Even the West Virginia rule is more liberal. See the text at
pages 173-174, 177-180 supra.
333 The jurisdictions are named and the statutes cited in CLARK, CODE
PLEADING 443, 468.
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(2) The Federal Rule. Federal Rule 18 permits joinder of
any claims which a party desires to assert against an opposing
party. 34 All resgrictions based on the origin or nature of the claims
have been remqved. The court may decide that separate trials are
necessary, 335 but no narrow view of "a cause of action" nor the
application of any restriction on joinder of causes can be used to
prevent joinder of any claims or any parties. The rule on joinder
of parties now contains the only limitations on joinder of claims
in the federal courts '. 3 3 6 Other advantages in having this liberal
rule have been discussed herein.33 7
This freedom in joining claims is permissive.A38 If a party fails
to join claims hereunder, he may assert them in other independent
actions if they were not parts of a single "cause of action" involved
in the former litigation "' 9 Any doubt may and should be resolved
by joinder.340
334 That rule reads: "The plaintiff in his complaint or in a reply setting
forth a counterclaim and the defendant in an answer setting forth a counter-
claim may join either as independent or as alternate claims as many claims
either legal or equitable or both as he may have against an opposing party.
There may be a. like joinder of claims when there are multiple parties if the
requirements of Rules 19, 20, and 22 are satisfied." Rule 18 (a), Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, following 28 U. S. C. A. §723c (1941).
Rules 19 and 20 determine what parties must or may be joined, and have
been discussed in the text at pages 199-200 supra. Rule 22 applies to interpleader
and is not to be discussed in this paper. The joinder of alternate claims,
counterclaims, and legal with equitable claims will be discussed in forthcoming
issues of this Review.
335 Rule 42 (b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, following 28 U. S. C. A.
§723c (1941), reads: "The court in furtherance of convenience or to avoid
prejudice may order a separate trial of any claim . . .or of any separate issue
or of any number of claims ... or issues."
Professor Moore aptly states that joinder of actions is a trial, and not a
pleading problem. 3 MooRE, FEDmAL PRAarcE §18.05. Rule 42(b) prevents
"embarrassment, delay or expense" which might otherwise result from the
liberal rules on joinder of claims. Id. at §42.02. Even in the absence of liberaliza-
tion of the rules on joinder of causes in West Virginia, a rule of this nature
might serve the same purpose in view of the existing possibilities as to joinder
of causes. See discussion in the text at pages 169-180 supra.
336 See note 834 supra.
337 Briefly, where a party may be in doubt as to the facts which he may
be able to prove or as to the legal theory which may be held applicable to the
facts proved, he may allege liability on a variety of facts or theories without
limitations based upon the forms of action which at present limit his choice.
See discussion in text at pages 169-177 supra.
338 See note 334 supra.
399 For a very practical approach to the problem of res adjudicata, see 2
MooRE, FERERAL PRACrcE §2.06[6).
340 That one should join claims where permitted to do so, even though
antecedently it appeared unnecessary, is well illustrated by Larzo v. Swift & Co.,
129 W. Va. 436, 40 S. E.2d 811 (1946), 51 W. VA. L. Q. 71 (1948).
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f. The Contrast
The differences between the West Virginia procedure and that
under the new Federal Rules as to joinder of causes and parties
might be more evident if some cases were examined in which the
Federal Rules have been applied. Professor Moore has summarized
the possibilities under the Federal Rules. For the sake of brevity,
his summary, omitting the supporting authority, is quoted for
comparison with the West Virginia cases previously discussed.
"[2]-One Plaintiff and One Defendant.
"Assume the case of one plaintiff, A, and one defendant,
X. A may join in one complaint as many claims, or causes of
action, as he has in his individual capacity against X, in his
individual capacity. Thus A may join such diverse causes of
action as action for breach of contract .... action on a note,
suit for negligent injury, . . etc.,
"[3]-Multiple Parties.
"A claim by A, as an individual, for conversion, and a
claim by A, as administrator, on an account due the estate,
would not fall within the above provisions. A is suing in
different capacities, and hence, there are essentially two differ-
ent plaintiffs. The same would be true if A sought to sue X,
as an individual, on one claim, and X, as administrator,
on another claim. Unlimited joinder is not authorized
here. The joinder is subject to the rules on parties, and would
be warranted if the claims arose out of the same transaction,
occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences and if there
was a question of law or fact common to the two claims.
"Subject to these rules on parties, A, B and C may join in
one action to press individual claims against X; or A may sue
X, Y, and Z on separate claims; or A, B and C may join
separate claims against X, Y and Z. Thus the joinder of the
different claims would be proper if the claims arose out of
the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences, and if there was a question of law or fact which
knit them together.
"May a claim in favor of A and B against X be joined
with an unrelated claim solely in favor of A against X; or a
claim of A against X and Y be joined with unrelated claim of
A against only X? ..... it was properly ruled that a claim
on a promissory note against three defendants could not be
joined with a claim on another note against two of the de-
fendants, where the claims did not arise out of the same trans-
action, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and
no common question of law or fact was present. If this basic
qualification of Rule 20 (a) is met, it is, of course, no objection
to the joinder that all of the claims do not affect all of the
parties.
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"There can, of course, be no question of misjoinder where
the claims are against the same parties, and hence it is proper
for A to join one claim against X and Y with an entirely
unrelated claim against X and Y. Assuming that the parties
are properly joined on each claim, it is immaterial that there
is no common question of fact as between the two claims:
the situation is the same where A joins two claims against a
single defendant."34'
The great freedom in joinder permitted by these rules may
create problems in the trial of the claims; so may the rules of
joinder now existing in West Virginia. However, to deal with such
problems Federal Rule 42 offers a device not available to a West
Virginia court. 34 - This rule provides that, for convenience or to
avoid prejudice, the court may order a separate trial of any claim
or of any separate issue or of any number of claims or issues. This
the court may do even though there is no question as to the
propriety of joinder of the claims. 34 3 In addition, other devices
available under the Federal Rules may eliminate many of the
issues before the case reaches the trial stage. These are matters for
discussion in forthcoming issues of this Review.
In concluding this part of the paper, attention naturally re-
verts to the West Virginia rule pertaining to actions on insurance
policies. This rule was promulgated by the Supreme Court of
Appeals in 1940 and provides:
"When any person has causes of action, arising from a
single occurrence or casualty, against two or more defendants,
under policies of insurance, containing similar or substantially
similar terms and conditions, having the same legal effect on
the question of liability, such person may, if he so elects, join
such causes in one action against such defendants. . . When
such joinder takes place all issues of law and fact shall be
tried together .... Before or at trial, a defendant on motion,
may be granted a separate trial if it appear that the cause
of action against such defendant is substantially different from
that of other defendants. 3 44
The liberality of the Federal Rules as to joinder of parties and
causes resounds in this rule. True, it is somewhat more restrictive
34' 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PAMCa §§18.04[21, 18.04[3]. The omissions in
this quotation deal with the additional claims which may or must be joined
as counterclaims or as legal with equitable claims in the same action. These
matters will be discussed in forthcoming issues of this Review.
340 See note 335 supra.
343 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE §18.05.
'44 121 W. Va. xxi, at xxii; 125 W. Va. on the first page (not numbered)
in the report.
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in that it appears to contemplate as a condition precedent to
joinder a question of law common to all the defendants, "4 " whereas
the federal rule would be satisfied if there were any question of
law or fact common to all of the defendants. 346 True too, the term
"a single occurrence or casualty" may be construed to be more
restrictive than "the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences."3 47 In addition, separate trials may be
held necessary if the narrow common law concept of a cause of
action is adopted in applying this rule, even though no incon-
venience or prejudice would result from a trial of all of the issues
at one time.3 4s Basically, however, the approach is toward the
freer joinder of parties and claims, at the pleading stage, as per-
mitted by the Federal Rules. One may hope that the liberality
shown in this rule will be extended to both plaintiffs and defend-
ants and that the restriction as to claims under policies of in-
surance will be eliminated. With experience based on such liberal-
ization, including observation as to the time and expense saved,
one may confidently expect that the freedom as to joinder of claims
permitted by the Federal Rules will soon be allowed in West
Virginia.
(Continued in a forthcoming issue of this Review.)
343 In addition to the requirement that the claims arise from a single
occurrence or casualty, the insurance policies must contain "similar or sub-
stantially similar terms and conditions, having the same legal effect on the
question of liability."
346 See Federal Rule 20 (a) quoted in the text at page 199 supra.
347 Ibid.
348 The rule provides that a separate trial may be granted if it appears
that "the cause of action" is substantially different from that of the other
defendants. This test may be applied in such a way that even within the
cases in which joinder is permitted, each defendant may obtain a separate trial
as to the claims asserted against him. Note how joinder of claims was defeated
by a narrow concept of a cause of action even though the rule permitting joinder
was more liberally worded than this part of the West Virginia rule. See notes
320, 332 supra. It may be hoped, even though a narrow concept of a cause
of action is applied, that the court will hold that the limiting words
"substantially different" embody the same idea expressed in the federal rule,
that is, so different that inconvenience or prejudice would result if a separate
trial is not granted. See note 335 supra.
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